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Comments
"AND IT ONLY TOOK THEM 307 YEARS": RUMINATIONS ON
LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL APPROACHES TO
DIVERSIFYING HEAD COACHING
IN COLLEGE FOOTBALL1
I. INTRODUCTION
Just like the states are laboratories for constitutional experi-
ments, sports are laboratories for equal opportunity in the United
States.2 While historically, the integration of professional and col-
legiate sports foreshadowed desegregation, the hurdle that minori-
ties still face in achieving head coaching positions in collegiate
football suggests that the glass ceiling in America has not yet shat-
tered.3 Myles Brand, the late President of the National Collegiate
1. Posting of Rick Chandler to DEADSPIN.COM, http://deadspin.com/
5124494/and-it-only-took-them-307-years (Jan. 6, 2009, 13:30 EST) (reporting
Yale's hiring of first black head football coach in University's history). Chandler
was exaggerating of course, considering the first college football game ever played
was between Rutgers and Princcton on November 6, 1869. See Rutgers - The
Birthplace of Intercollegiate Football, http://www.scarletknights.com/football/
history/first-game.asp. (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (detailing history of Rutgers
football program). The point is that even progressive-minded institutions, like
Yale, are responsible for the perpetuation of discrimination in the hiring of head
coaches in collegiate football.
2. See Brian W. Collins, Comment, Tackling Unconscious Bias in Hiring Practices:
The Plight of the Rooney Rule, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 870, 873 (2007) (noting that begin-
ning of experiment was Jackie Robinson's breaking of color barrier in baseball);
Kenneth L. Shropshire, Merit, 01' Boy Networks, and the Black-Bottomed Pyramid, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 455, 456 (1996) (calling sports "microcosm of society"); Aaron T.
Walker, Comment, Title VII & MLB Minority Hiring: Alternatives to Litigation, 10 U.
PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 245, 250 (2007) (referring to sports as "litmus test" for pro-
gress); C. KEITH HARRISON & SHARON YEE, WHO You KNow & WHO KNOWS You:
THE HIRING PROCESS & PRACTICE OF NCAA FBS & FCS HEAD COACHING POSITIONS
10 (5th ed. 2008), http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/bca/genrel/auto-pdf/
08-hiring-report-card.pdf [hereinafter Hiring Report Card] (referring to sports as
microcosm of society).
3. See Collins, supra note 2, at 879 (citing Robert E. Thomas and Bruce Louis
Rich, Under the Radar: The Resistance of Promotion Biases to Market Economic Forces, 55
SYRACUSE L. REv. 301, 303 (2005)); Andr6 Douglas Pond Cummings, Pushing
Weight, 33 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 95, 97-98 (explaining exclusion of minorities from
decision-making roles). Kenneth Shropshire explains that, while representation
levels of minorities among athletes may be indicative of equality, equal opportunity
does not exist yet at the higher levels of the hierarchy in sports. See Shropshire,
supra note 2, at 456-57 (referring to minority deficiencies in coaching and manage-
ment positions).
(161)
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Athletic Association (NCAA), described the problem during his
2007 State of the Association address when he said, " [T] he propor-
tion of ethnic minority head football coaches is inexcusably low."
4
For some time prior to that speech, however, Brand knew that col-
lege football head coaching was the "most segregated position" in
all of collegiate athletics. 5 Despite this knowledge, Brand and the
NCAA continue to ignore repeated calls to reform the hiring pro-
cess for college football head coaches. 6
This Comment analyzes legal and non-legal efforts to diversify
college football head coaching. Section II summarizes the state of
diversity in college football head coaching, the possible causes of
the dearth of minority head coaches, and the effect that the lack of
diversity has upon the coaches. Section III describes the central
remedy suggested by advocates - the Robinson Rule. Section III
also addresses the NCAA's attempt to appease Robinson Rule sup-
porters and explains criticism levied against the Robinson Rule.
Section IV discusses the threat of legal action against universities
that do and do not adopt the Robinson Rule. It explains that both
private and public universities may be susceptible to Title VII liabil-
ity whether they accept the Robinson Rule or not, while public uni-
versities might also expose themselves to liability for violating
coaches' equal protection rights.
Section IV emphasizes the importance that statistical data will
play in a Title VII suit against a university because the nature of
sports, unlike many other industries, makes performance easy to
quantify. Moreover, Section IV dispels some myths about the im-
possibility of a coach succeeding in a discrimination lawsuit, yet af-
firms the belief that despite the NCAA's partial responsibility, it will
not be held legally accountable for the lack of diversity among head
coaches. Further, Section IV analyzes the only case, thus far, where
4. Myles Brand, President, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 'Citizens in a Civil
Society,' State of the Association at NCAA Convention (Jan. 15, 2007), http://
www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentlD=40976 [hereinafter Brand Address]. During
the editing of this article Brand died of pancreatic cancer. See Chris Dufresne,
Myles Brand Dies at 67, NCAA President, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2009, available at http:/
/www.latimes.com/news/obituaries/la-me-myles-brandl 7-2009sepl 7,0,6624982.st-
ory (eulogizing Brand's life).
5. Hiring Report Card, supra note 2, at 9.
6. See Michael J. Nichols, Note, Time for a Hail Mary? With Bleak Prospects of
Being Aided by a College Version of the NFL 's Rooney Rule, Should Minority College Football
Coaches Turn Their Attention to Title VII Litigation ?, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 147, 161
(2008) (explaining that NCAA has most power to invoke change but has not uti-
lized it); Michael S. Ford, The BCA and the NCAA: How Title VII May Level the Playing
Field in the Collegiate Coaching Ranks, 32 RurGERS L. REc. 88, 90 (2008) (explaining
NCAA's lack of action).
[Vol. 17: p. 161
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a coach brought Title VII claims against a university, Jackson v. Uni-
versity of New Haven, and what that case teaches us about the need to
find the right plaintiff for impact litigation. Section V explains the
NCAA's grossly inadequate response to the dearth of minority
coaches and why its efforts are insufficient. Finally, Section VI sum-
marizes and proposes alternatives to the Robinson Rule that have
equal potential to trigger real and immediate change.
II. THE STATE OF DIVERSITY IN COACHING
A. The Numbers
At the start of the 2009-2010 academic year, only 9 of the 119
head football coaches at Division I-A schools were minorities.7
They included Turner Gill at the State University of New York at
Buffalo, Randy Shannon at the University of Miami (FL), Mike
Locksley at the University of New Mexico, Kevin Sumlin at the Uni-
versity of Houston, Ron English at Eastern Michigan University,
Mike Haywood at the University of Miami (OH), DeWayne Walker
at New Mexico State University, Mario Cristobal at Florida Interna-
tional University, and Ken Niumatalolo at the U.S. Naval Academy.
8
Thus, only 7.5% of Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) head coaches
are minorities. 9 If you combine all three divisions, only 4.8% of
collegiate head football coaches are minorities.' 0 In the history of
7. See Rachel Cohen, Report Faults Diversity Hiring Practices in NCAA, ABC NEWS.
COM Feb. 19, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory?id=6918839 [herein-
after Report Faults Diversity] (discussing NCAA's defense of weak hiring statistics).
8. See Aggies to Announce Walker as Coach on Wednesday, ESPN.coM, Dec. 30,
2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=3800440&type=story (announc-
ing hiring of minority head coach); Redhawks Hire Former Irish Offensive Coordinator
Haywood, ESPN.coM, Dec. 24, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id
=3789838 (stating that minority head coach was hired); see also Richard Lapchick et
al., The 2008 Racial and Gender Report Card, TIDESPORT.ORG, Feb. 19, 2009, http://
www.tidesport.org/RGRC/2008/2008CollegRGRC.pdf [hereinafter Racial and
Gender Report Card] (listing minority FBS coaches). Division I football is split into
two subdivisions - I-A and I-B. See Andrew Wible, FCS Programs Narrowing Gap with
FBS Foes (Aug. 29, 2008), http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/2008/08/29/fcs
programs-narrowing-gapwit.aspx (detailing progress of Football Championship
Subdivision). Division I-A is also known as the Football Bowl Subdivision ("FBS"),
while Division I-B is also known as the Football Championship Subdivision
("FCS"). See id. These names are used interchangeably throughout the article.
9. See Racial and Gender Report Card, supra note 8, at 14 (providing statistical
breakdown of coaches' ethnicities).
10. See id. at 15 (showing lack of minorities in Division I-A). Whites make up
89.2%, 88.7%, and 92.5% of all coaches for all sports in Divisions I, II and III
respectively. See id. at 4. Blacks make up 7.2%, 5.3%, and 4.0% of coaches in
Divisions I, II and III respectively. See id. Whites hold 76.9%, 79.0%, and 88.1% of
the assistant coaching positions in Divisions I, II and III respectively. See id. at 5.
Daniel Louis notes that from 1982 to 2006, there were 414 coaching vacancies in
Division I-A football and only twenty-one of them were filled with minorities. See
2010]
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Division I-A college football, only twenty-seven minorities have ever
served as head coaches.11
B. Isolating the Cause
In a hearing before Congress, Brand alleged three reasons for
the lack of minority head coaches in collegiate sports.12 First,
Brand asserted that the NCAA cannot regulate the hiring decisions
of colleges and universities.13 Brand explained that, unlike aca-
demic reform, the hiring of coaches cannot be regulated because
colleges and universities have not agreed to regulation. 14 Second,
schools are "risk-averse" in hiring football head coaches because of
the financial implications it has for the school. 15 There is a tremen-
dous amount of pressure to succeed and subsequently, schools re-
sort to hiring "proven coach[es]" rather than up-and-coming
Daniel J. Louis, Note, Nationally Televised Segregation: The NCAA 's Inability to Desegre-
gate College Football's Head Coaching Position, 9 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv. 167, 172
(2007) (citing Associated Press, Black Coaches Say Hiring Progress Too Slow: D-I Schools
Did Better, But Need More Representative Search Committees, NBC SPoRTs.coM, Sept. 21,
2006, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/14938013/). Shropshire adds that "the
sports industry resembles a black-bottomed pyramid: large numbers of African-
American athlete-participants, but few African-Americans in non-playing positions
at the highest levels." Shropshire, supra note 2, at 456-57 (outlining that attempts
to address black-bottomed pyramid "have been inadequate").
11. See Racial and Gender Report Card, supra note 8, at 36 (listing minority
coaches). Those coaches are: WillieJeffries (Wichita State), Dennis Green (North-
western and Stanford), Cleve Bryant (Ohio University), Wayne Nunnely (Las
Vegas), Francis Peay (Northwestern), Willie Brown (Long Beach State), James
Caldwell (Wake Forest), Ron Cooper (Eastern Michigan and Louisville), Matt Si-
mon (University of North Texas), Bob Simmons (Oklahoma State), John Blake
(Oklahoma), Tony Samuel (New Mexico State), Jerry Baldwin (Louisiana Lafay-
ette), Bobby Williams (Michigan State), Ron Dickerson (Temple), Fitzgerald Hill
(San Jose State), Tyrone Willingham (Stanford, Notre Dame and Washington),
Karl Dorrell (UCLA), Sylvester Croom (Mississippi State), Barry Alvarez (Wiscon-
sin), Ron Prince (Kansas State), Turner Gill (University of Buffalo), Mario Cristo-
bal (Florida International University), Randy Shannon (University of Miami),
Dewayne Walker (New Mexico State), Rich Rodriguez (West Virginia University
and University of Michigan), Ken Niumatalolo (Naval Academy) and Kevin Sumlin
(University of Houston). See id. (listing minority coaches, team, years of service
and record).
12. See The Lack of Diversity in Leadership Positions in NCAA Collegiate Sports: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. 14-18 (2007), available at http://frwebgate.ac-
cess.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1 10_househearings&docid--f:35220.pdf
[hereinafter Diversity Hearing] (explaining dearth of minority head coaches).
13. See id. at 15 (claiming NCAA does not have control over schools' hiring
decisions).
14. See id. (supporting schools' autonomy). This reasoning is suspicious in
light of the adoption of suggested hiring guidelines by Division I Athletic Direc-
tors. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
15. See Diversity Hearing, supra note 12, at 16 (noting schools' motivations).
[Vol. 17: p. 161
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assistant coaches. 16 Third, the informal networks that are used to
compile candidates for coaching positions filter out minorities. 17
These informal networks unintentionally exclude minorities from
consideration due to their connections and friends, in what has
been called the social network theory. 18
Social network theory proposes that "job opportunities gener-
ally arise through one's ties to other people and one's secondary
ties through one's primary contacts to their networks."1 9 Conse-
quently, social networks serve to maintain traditional power struc-
tures by denying outsiders access to the elite network.20 Kenneth
Shropshire explained the phenomenon, saying that athletic direc-
tors do not consider minority candidates because when they ask
their friends for recommendations, those friends often recommend
their own white friends. 21 The candidates on an athletic director's
"short list" often make the list because of their personal connec-
tions to the school or others in collegiate athletics.22 The process is
16. Id. (explaining schools' thought processes).
17. See id. (stating that getting hired to coach depends on who you know);
Collins, supra note 2, at 872 (discussing that NFL teams avoided minorities due to
unconscious bias).
18. See Hannah Gordon, Comment, The Robinson Rule: Models for Addressing
Race Discrimination in the Hiring of NCAA Head Football Coaches, 15 SPORTS LAw. J. 1, 5
(2008) ("Social network theory, as opposed to old-fashioned racism, is the most
common explanation for the low numbers."). Social network theory is commonly
referred to as the 'Old Boy' Network. See Collins, supra note 2, at 876 (discussing
unconscious bias and its prevalence).
19. Gordon, supra note 18, at 5 (citing C. Keith Harrison et al., "SCORING THE
HIRE:" A HIRING REPORT CARD AND SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS FOR NCAA DISION
IA AND IAA FOOTBALL HEAD COACHING POSITIONS IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION
19 (2006), available at http://graphics.fansonly.com/schools/bca/graphics/hrc/
HRCfootball-06.pdf); see also Hiring Report Card, supra note 2, at 30 (describing so-
cial network theory in terms of 'hiring trees').
20. See Collins, supra note 2, at 876 (describing resulting exclusion of minori-
ties); Shropshire, supra note 2, at 461 (explaining that "O1' Boy" networks are
product of unconscious racial bias); Walker, supra note 2, at 249 (discussing social
network theory and "old boy network" hiring practices in baseball context).
21. See Shropshire, supra note 2, at 461 (describing unconscious racial motiva-
tions leading to development of social networks). Bill Walsh, a Hall of Fame foot-
ball coach, described football coaching as "a very fraternal thing. You end up
calling friends, and the typical coach hasn't been exposed to many black coaches."
Id. (quoting Claire Smite, Too Few Changes Since Campanis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16,
1992, at 1, 2). Shropshire explains that social network theory is not unique to the
sports industry. See id. at 461-62 (discussing social networks in and outside of
sports). He notes that "Jason Wright, an African American vice president at RJR
Nabisco, Inc., said about the business world [that], 'The reality of life in America is
that if you're white, most of the people you know are white. If someone says to you,
'Do you know anyone for this job?' the people you recommend will probably be
white.'" Id. (quoting Race in the Workplace, Bus. WK., July 8, 1991 at 50).
22. Collins, supra note 2, at 877 (citingJim Moye, Comment, Punt or Go for the
Touchdown? A Title VII Analysis of the National Football League's Hiring Practices for
20101
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also present when head coaches give assistant coaching and coordi-
nator opportunities to coaches with whom they have worked in the
past.23
Social networks also exclude minorities because there is a sub-
stantial lack of diversity among those making the hiring decisions. 24
Subsequently, commentators believe that the dearth of minority
coaches can be attributed to the scarcity of minority athletic direc-
tors.2 5 In current Division I athletic ranks, there are only eleven
black and four Latino athletic directors out of 120.26 If the diversity
Head Coaches, 6 UCLA Err. L. REv. 105, 130-32 (1998)). Making this list is critical
because only afterwards can the candidate vie for the position. See Ford, supra note
6,1 18. Collins further explains:
While it seems eminently reasonable for a decision-maker to seek the
evaluation of those he or she knows and trusts when making choices from
among a number of outstanding candidates, this extensive reliance on
mutual friends and colleagues - i.e., other network members - operates
"to exclude even those few minorities [who] have managed to surmount
the more easily quantifiable barriers to access."
Collins, supra note 2, at 877 (quoting Charles R. Lawrence III, Minority Hiring in
AALS Law Schools: The Need for Voluntary Quotas, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 429, 435-36
(1986)).
23. See Hiring Report Card, supra note 2, at 17-19 (showing how assistant
coaches have connections); Gordon, supra note 18, at 5-6 (describing coordinator
job as "stepping stone" to becoming head coach); Collins, supra note 2, at 882
(speaking about connections for assistants in NFL and NBA). The BCA demon-
strated how important connections are in its Hiring Report Card by creating a
hiring tree of all the head coaches in the NFL who could trace their roots to Bill
Walsh. See Hiring Report Card, supra note 2, at 17. In total, fourteen NFL head
coaches, past and present, worked for Bill Walsh or someone who formerly worked
for Bill Walsh. See id. The BCA also showed that three minority head coaches -
Lovie Smith, Herman Edwards and Mike Tomlin - all worked under minority
coach Tony Dungy at one point. See id. at 18. Doug Williams, the former head
football coach at Grambling State University, said this phenomenon, "isn't really
racism. It's buddy-buddy. And sometimes buddy-buddy is the same thing."
Gordon, supra note 18, at 6 (quoting Gary Shelton, Color Barrier, ST. PETERSBURG
TiMEsJune 2, 1991, at IC). Shropshire explains that social networks are extremely
difficult to break down and overcome. See Shropshire, supra note 2, at 462. He
believes that affirmative steps need to be taken to diversify networks, but that those
steps are often met with resistance. See id. at 462-63.
24. See Diversity Hearing, supra note 12, at 16 (explaining existence of social
networks). "The 2006 BCA Hiring Report stated that only 34 of 134 coaching
search committee members nationwide - or 1.3 per school - were minorities."
Ford, supra note 6, 1 15 (citing C. Keith Harrison, Scoring the Hire: A Hiring Report
Card and Social Network Analysis for the NCAA Division 1-A and I-AA Football Head
Coaching Positions in American Higher Education, at v (Sept. 21, 2006)).
25. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 6 (noting that ninety-four percent of athletic
directors are white); Ford, supra note 6, 17 (noting that in 2008 there were only
eleven African-American and three Latino athletic directors in Division I athletics).
26. See Racial and Gender Report Card, supra note 8, at 19 (discussing lack of
minority coaching). When looking at all three divisions, Whites make up 90.0%,
92.0% and 97.0% of the athletic directors in the divisions respectively. See id. at 6.
Blacks make up 7.2%, 3.8% and 1.8% of the athletic directors in Divisions I, II and
III respectively. See id. Latinos made up 1.9%, 3.0% and 0% of the athletics direc-
6
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of those hiring head coaches were to increase, some believe that the
representation of minority coaches would follow.
2 7
Athletic directors are not the only people responsible for hir-
ing head coaches at colleges and universities.28 Aside from athletic
directors, university trustees, presidents, provosts, chancellors,
faculty athletic representatives, and other athletic department staff
members participate in the selection process. 29 Moreover, donors,
politicians, alumni, conference officials, NCAA officials, the media,
student-athletes, and fans can influence the hiring of a head
coach. 30 The diversity of some of these groups is no better, and
sometimes worse, than the diversity of coaches themselves: 92.5% of
university presidents are white, while 78.3% are white males; 86.7%
of athletic directors are white, while 82.5% are white males; 92.6%
of faculty athletics representatives are white, while 67.2% are white
males; and 100% of FBS Conference Commissioners are white and
they are also all white males.3 1 Although, the absence of minority
head coaches cannot be directly attributed to the lack of diversity
tors in the three divisions respectively. See id. Women make up 7.8%, 15.6% and
27.1% of the athletic directors in Divisions 1, 11 and III respectively. See id.
27. See Ford, supra note 6, 17 (noting that external pressures athletic direc-
tors face will not lessen even with more minority athletic directors).
28. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 152 (explaining outside influence in universi-
ties' hiring).
29. See id. (mentioning university administrators and faculty involved in head
coach hiring process). ESPN recently reported on colleges using search firms dur-
ing the hiring of head football coaches. See Chuck Neinas: College Football Headhunter
(ESPN television broadcast Aug. 28, 2009), http://espn.go.com/video/
clip?id=4429850 (reporting on increasing use of search firms such as Neinas Sports
Services). At this point, however, very little is known about these firms other than
that there use is on the rise. See id. (explaining that firms are valued for keeping
process confidential); see also OTL Roundtable: Civil Rights Movement (ESPN televi-
sion broadcast Dec. 14, 2008), http://espn.go.com/video/clip?id=3768645 (in-
cluding caution from Lapchick about need to investigate use of search firms).
30. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 152 (listing other university personnel in-
volved in head coach hiring process but whose influence is harder to quantify).
Brand explained that with so many parties involved in the hiring process it is hard
to pinpoint, or alternatively apportion who is to blame. See id. (citing Charles
Dervarics, Congressional Panel Explores Options for Boosting Minorities in College Head
Coaching Ranks, DIVERSE ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, (Mar. 1, 2007), available at
http://www. diverseeducation.com/artman/publish/article-7069.shtml).
31. See id. at 153 (citing Richard Lapchick, The Buck Stops Here: Assessing Diver-
sity Among Campus and Conference Leaders for Football Bowl Subdivision (EBS) Schools in
the 2008-09 Academic Year, TIDESPORT.ORG, Nov. 6, 2008, http://web.bus.ucf.edu/
documents/sport/200809 fbs demographics-study.pdf). Blacks made up 2.5%
and Latinos 4.2% of university presidents. See Racial and Gender Report Card, supra
note 8, at 3. Females made up 17.5% of university presidents. See id. Moreover,
83.3% of the faculties at Division I-A schools are white, while only 3.5% are black
and 3.4% Latino. See Richard Lapchick, THE BUCK STOPS HERE: ASSESSING DiVER-
SITY AMONG CAMPUS AND CONFERENCE LEADERS FOR FOOTBALL Bowt SUBDIqSION
(FBS) SCHOOLS IN 2008-09 ACADEMIC YEAR (2008), available at http://web.bus.ucf.
2010]
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among those involved in the hiring process, the Black Coaches &
Administrators (BCA) found that for every additional minority on a
school's search committee, the number of minority candidates in-
terviewed increases by 0.5.32
Some posit that boosters contribute to the diversity problem.
33
Boosters are one of an athletic program's largest donors. 34 The be-
lief is that the decision-makers factor in the boosters' monetary con-
tributions when they hire head coaches. 3 5 Former Grambling Head
Football Coach, Doug Williams, explained that 'the [college]
presidents and athletic directors are afraid to make decisions that
might irk some of their big-time boosters.' 36 Therefore, the pre-
edu/documents/sport/200809_fbsdemographics-study.pdf [hereinafter The
Buck Stops Here] (listing diversity statistics of Division I-A schools).
32. See C. Keith Harrison et al., "SCORING THE HiRE:" A HIRING REPORT CARD
AND SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS FOR NCAA DivisioN IA AND IAA FOOTBALL HEAD
COACHING POSITIONS IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 7 (2006), available at http://
graphics.fansonly.com/schools/bca/graphics/hrc/HRCfootball-06.pdf (showing
impact of diverse search committees); Walker, supra note 2, at 270 (explaining
benefits of diverse search committee); Nichols, supra note 6, at 153-54 (discussing
reluctance to embrace mandatory minority interview policy). However, this begs
the question of why college football has failed to share the same success enjoyed by
college basketball in diversifying its coaching ranks.
33. See Bram A. Maravent, Comment, Is the Rooney Rule Affirmative Action? Ana-
lyzing the NFL's Mandate to Its Clubs Regarding Coaching and Front Office Hires, 13
SPORTS LAW.J. 233, 272 (2006) (describing role of boosters in university athletics);
Louis, supra note 10, at 180-81 (asserting that boosters heavily influence athletic
directors); Bram Maravent & Ben Tario, Leveling the Playing Field: Can Title VII Work
to Increase Minority Coaching Hires in NCAA Athletics?, 81 FLA. BJ. 44, 48 (2007)
(describing boosters as big hurdle).
34. See Maravent, supra note 33, at 272 (explaining that boosters help universi-
ties build stadiums, buy new equipment and pay large coaching salaries); Louis,
supra note 10, at 181 (detailing boosters' monetary influence); Maravent & Tario,
supra note 33, at 48 (outlining role of boosters).
35. See Louis, supra note 10, at 181 (mentioning boosters' influence).
36. Maravent, supra note 33, at 272 (quoting Liz Clarke, In College Football, A
Glaring Disparity; Only Two Blacks Among 117 Head Coaches, WASH. POST, Dec. 5,
2004, at A01). Professor Gary Roberts of Tulane University Law School said,
A head football coach . . . is much more than a football coach. He is
somebody who is expected to raise a lot of money, to move gently among
the alumni and be one of the good old boys.... There was unbelievable
alumni pressure put on our president not to hire [a head coach of color],
simply because they didn't want him going to the men's clubs in down-
town New Orleans and mingling in a milieu where theyjust aren't used to
black faces .... [T]here are so many older alumni who harken back to
earlier days, who have a lot of money to give, who [teams] don't want to
alienate.... [In] basketball it has broken down, because... pressures on
the basketball coach are not quite the same as they are on the football
coach ....
Collins, supra note 2, at 883-84 (quoting Symposium, Is the System Flawed? Legal
Ramifications of the Bowl Championship Series and Conference Alignment, 7 VAND. J. ENT.
L. & PRAc. 461, 479-80 (2005)).
[Vol. 17: p. 161
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sumption is that hiring a black head coach will make boosters
unhappy.3 7
Other commentators do not agree that such benign forces are
at play.3 8 They argue that minorities are continuously excluded
from head coaching positions because decision-makers persistently
devalue their worth . 9 A large factor that contributes to the dis-
counting of minorities' coaching capabilities is unconscious bias. 40
Unconscious bias is a result of categorization and stereotyping that
serves to perpetuate discrimination despite the intent and aware-
ness of the decision-maker. 4 1
37. See Louis, supra note 10, at 181 (explaining that boosters will donate less if
school hires black coach). Louis believes it is necessary "when imposing a remedy
... to keep in mind the pecuniary interests of the institutions and perhaps con-
sider monetary penalties to teams who do not follow appropriate remedial mea-
sures." Id.
38. SeeJacquelyn Bridgeman, The Thrill of Victory and the Agony of Defeat: What
Sports Tell Us About Achieving Equality in America, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 248, 256
(2008) (describing categorization and stereotyping by majority of Americans); Col-
lins, supra note 2, at 874 (noting prevalence of unconscious racial bias).
39. See Bridgeman, supra note 38, at 256-57 (discussing effect of stereotypes).
40. See id. at 257 (describing research on unconscious bias); Collins, supra
note 2, at 872, (arguing that Rooney Rule counters unconscious bias); N. Jeremi
Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, the Rooney Rule, and the Quest to "Level the Playing
Field" in the National Football League, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 179, 188 (2008) (de-
tailing studies on prevalence and effects of subconscious discrimination and bias).
Collins notes that Professor David Strauss believes unconscious bias may be more
common today than conscious bias. See Collins, supra note 2, at 874 n.19 (citing
David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv.
935, 960 (1989)). While many people would adamantly deny that they ever act
with racial animus, Charles Lawrence explains unconscious racism as follows:
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which ra-
cism has played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared
experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that
attach significance to an individual's race and induce negative feelings
and opinions about nonwhites. To the extent that this cultural belief sys-
tem has influenced all of us, we are all racists. At the same time, most of
us are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize the ways in which our
cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the occa-
sions on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other words, a large
part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by
unconscious racial motivation.
Shropshire, supra note 2, at 461 (quoting Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322
(1987)); see also Duru, supra, at 188 (examining unconscious bias and effect of
accusations of racism).
41. See Bridgeman, supra note 38, at 257 (explaining lack of awareness of un-
conscious bias); see also Collins, supra note 2, at 875 (suggesting unconscious bias
may be more "insidious" than conscious bias). Bridgeman explains that categori-
zation activates stereotypes, which contain the thinker's knowledge, opinions and
expectations of a particular group. See Bridgeman, supra note 38, at 265. Lu-in
Wang adds that "'[t]hese processes and biases are subtle and operate largely by
default.' As a result the situations that help cause and entrench discrimination are
also the situations which cause us to see such discrimination as normal and correct
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The devaluing of minorities' worth as football coaches often
manifests itself in the subconscious stereotype that blacks do not
have the intellectual capacity to be effective head football
coaches.42 Brand inadvertently summed up this consideration best
when he said:
- the natural state of things - which in turn make such discrimination very difficult
to identify, address, and eradicate." Id. at 257 (quoting LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINA-
TION By DEFAULT: How RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE 18 (2006)). Bridgeman suggests
that thinking without categorization and stereotyping is difficult because they are
efficient. See id. at 258. But to achieve equality it is necessary to subdue them as a
default practice of cognitive functioning. See id. at 258-59 (quoting Luin Wang,
DISCRIMINATION By DEFAULT: How RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE 18 (2006)). The sup-
pression of categorization and stereotypes is important to achieve equality because
they affect what we remember about other people and how we interact with them.
See id. at 264-65. For example, unconscious bias results in differing treatment of
minorities during interviews. See id. at 267 (citing Carl 0. Word et al., The Nonver-
bal Mediation of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial Interaction, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 109, 119 (1974)). Moreover, perceptions gathered from a resume
as to whether a candidate is black or white affect the decision to extend an oppor-
tunity to interview. See id. (citing Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are
Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor
Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REv. 991, 1006-07 (2004)). Additionally, where
qualifications are equal, yet ambiguous, a white candidate's qualifications will be
treated as greater than a black candidate's. See id. (citing John F. Dovidio & Sa-
muel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 11
PSYCHOL. SCI. 315, 318 (2000)).
42. See Duru, supra note 40, at 184 (explaining that blacks are stigmatized as
intellectually inferior, which hurts coaching prospects); Collins, supra note 2, at
875 (noting that subconscious perceptions of intellectual inferiority persist). Col-
lins believes that part of the reason that unconscious perceptions of intellectual
inferiority persist is that those who maintain those thoughts live and work in non-
diverse atmospheres. See id. (explaining that those who do not engage in diverse
environments are only exposed to blacks who are athletes). Coaching is not the
only position in football that blacks are excluded from because of perceived intel-
lectual inferiority. SeeJason Chung, Racial Discrimination and African-American
Quarterback in the National Football League 3-4 (Nov. 29, 2004) (unpublished
article, on file with author) (describing exclusion of blacks from quarterback posi-
tion); Duru, supra note 40, at 182 (explaining that quarterback position was re-
served for white players). Chung explains that there is a "stacking phenomenon"
in football where black athletes are directed towards "reactive positions," whereas
positions that require intellect are reserved for whites. See Chung, supra, at 3 (cit-
ing WILBERT MARCELLUS LEONARD I[, A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OF SPORT 275
(Burgess Publ'g Co. 1980)). Thus for a long time blacks were not considered "cer-
ebral" enough to play quarterback. See id. (citing Richard E. Lapchick, Crime and
Athletics: The New Racial Stereotypes of the 1990's, Center for the Study of Sports
in Society (Nov. 19, 2004)). They were shifted to other positions to maximize their
athletic potential. See id. (citing Jon Entine, Taboo: Why Black Athletes Dominate
Sports and Why We're Afraid to Talk About It, NEW YORK: PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 277 (2000)).
Lapchick shows that in 2007, only nineteen percent of quarterbacks were black,
while seventy-six percent where white. See Richard Lapchick et al., THE 2008 RA-
CIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD: NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 28 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter AFL Report Card] (listing racial breakdown by position). This, however, is an
improvement from 1993, when ninety-three percent of quarterbacks were white.
See id. Center, another traditionally white position, was seventy-seven percent
white and eighteen percent black in 2007. See id. (demonstrating representation
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[A] head football coach - even more so than a head basketball
coach - must not only understand the complexities of the game,
but they must hire and manage staff of two dozen or more, organ-
ize the development of more than a hundred student athletes into
various skill units, recruit in competition with dozens of other top
teams for the best available talent, appeal to alumni and donors for
both athletics and campus-wide development, and often be a
spokesperson for the university. And they must win! 43
Therefore, athletic directors and presidents who unconsciously
believe that minorities' success in sports is attributable to innate
physical ability, and not to dedication and intellect, fail to offer mi-
norities head coaching positions, which require a high degree of
intellect.
4 4
of whites and blacks in this position has not changed much since early 1990s).
Traditionally black positions, such as running back and wide-receiver, have consist-
ently been around ninety percent black and nine percent white. See id. Chung
explains, however, that blacks were never given a chance to succeed as
quarterbacks. See Chung, supra, at 4. Blacks could not succeed because when they
were allowed to play as quarterbacks, coaches made them execute a run-oriented
offense that was looked down upon in the NFL as too simple. See id. Moreover,
the NFL uses intelligence tests - like the Wonderlic - that have very little predic-
tive effect and that blacks generally score lower on. See id. at 6-9. Janice Madden
believes, however, that historical discrimination against blacks in quarterbacking is
not a cause of the underrepresentation of minority coaches. Janice Fanning Mad-
den, Differences in the Success of NFL Coaches by Race, 1990-2002: Evidence of Last Hire,
First Fire, 5 JOURNAL OF SPORTS ECONOMics 6, 16 (2004) [hereinafter Madden Re-
port] (examining what positions NFL coaches played before they coached). She
found that there does not seem to be a position or set of positions that coaches
formerly played. See id. Madden explained that eleven of the thirty-two NFL head
coaches in 2002 played traditionally black positions, such as defensive back and
running back, whereas sixteen of the thirty-two NFL coaches played traditionally
white positions, such as quarterback, center, guard, and linebacker. See id. at 16-
17. (see R. 1.2, 1.5, 4.1, 4.2, 16, 15, 17).
43. Press Release, National Collegiate Athletic Association, Statement of
Myles Brand, NCAA President, Before the House Subcommittee on Commerce,
Trade and Consumer Protection (Feb. 28, 2007), available at http://www2.ncaa.
org/wps/wcm/connect/ncaa/NCAA/Media+and+Events/Press+Room/News+Re-
lease+Archive/2007/Official+Statements/Statement+of+Myles+Brand+NCAA+
Presiden t+Before+the+House+Subcommittee+on+Commerce+Trade+and+Con-
sumer+Protection?pageDesign=Printer+Friendly+News+Release+Detail+Layout
(summarizing complexities of head coaching). Collins explored the diverging na-
ture of diversity in the head coaching ranks between professional basketball and
football. See Collins, supra note 2, at 877-79 (explaining that there is much more
opportunity for minorities to become head coach in professional basketball). He
attributes the divergence partly to a high degree of "organization complexity" in
football. Id. at 878-79. Collins contends that the organizational complexity of foot-
ball makes decision-makers consider intellect when making hiring decisions. See
id. at 878.
44. See Collins, supra note 2, at 872 (explaining that lack of exposure to mi-
norities leads to racial stereotyping). Bridgeman asserts that the integration of
minorities into sports changed people's perception of minorities, at least in re-
spect to their ability to play sports. See Bridgeman, supra note 38, at 254. She
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C. The Effect on the Coaches
As a result of the glass ceiling in collegiate football, many
coaches abandon collegiate positions to work in the National Foot-
ball League (NFL) .4 5 College football is losing its most talented
assistant coaches and coordinators, thereby shrinking the pool of
able minority candidates for college head coaching positions.4 6 For
example, Jon Embree, Eric Bieniemy, Norm Chow, and Curtis
Johnson are just some of the elite coaches who have left college
football for greater opportunities at the professional level.47 Work-
ing as an assistant coach or coordinator in the NFL increases the
odds of becoming head coach at the collegiate level. 48 Karl Dorell,
Ty Willingham, and Sylvester Croom worked as assistant coaches in
the NFL before they were hired as head coaches in the FBS.49
explained that previously, minorities' athletic ability, intelligence and work ethic
were doubted. See id. Now, however, no one doubts the ability of minorities to
succeed in sports. See id. at 254-55. Collins, however, still believes that characteri-
zation of the reasons behind an athlete's success is still divided along racial lines:
white athletes are characterized as intelligent and hardworking, while black ath-
letes' successes are attributed to natural physical ability. See Collins, supra note 2,
at 876 (discussing media reports and polls on athlete characterization). Moreover,
by characterizing black athletes' successes as due to natural ability it suggests that
they did not earn their success, especially when white athletes are described as
hardworking. See id. (citing Phillip M. Hoose, NECESSITIES: RACIAL BARRIERS IN
AMERICAN SPORTS 19 (1989)). Kellen Winslow explained his experience with stere-
otyping and the different treatment he faced both as a player and as a retiree
looking for a career in coaching:
As long as I was on the field of play I was treated and viewed differently
than most African-American men in this country. Because of my physical
abilities, society accepted and even catered to me. Race was not an issue.
Then reality came calling. After a nine-year career in the National Foot-
ball League filled with honors and praises, I stepped into the real world
and realized ... I was just another nigger ... the images and stereotypes
that applied to African-American men in this country attached to me.
Duru, supra note 40, at 192-93 (quoting Kellen Winslow, Foreword to KENNETH L.
SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE AND SPORTS IN AMERICA, at xi (NYU Press
1996)).
45. See Ford, supra note 6, 49 (explaining why college coaches leave for
professional football); Maravent, supra note 33, at 273 (encouraging adoption of
Rooney Rule to prevent phenomenon).
46. See Ford, supra note 6, 49 (assessing effect on head coaching diversity in
college football). If this trend continues, however, the NFL will not have the ca-
pacity to employ all the qualified coaches who choose to defect.
47. See id. (citing Mike Fish, Colorado, Others Barely Make the Minority Grade,
ESPN.coM, Feb. 10, 2006, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/blackhis-
tory/news /story?id=2325630) (naming coaches that left college football for NFL);
Maravent, supra note 33, at 273 (describing story of Norm Chow leaving USC for
Tennessee Titans).
48. See Ford, supra note 6, 49 (noting another benefit of defecting).
49. See id. (quoting Mike Fish, Colorado, Others Barely Make the Minority Grade,
ESPN.coM, Feb. 20, 2006, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/black his-
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Additionally, the lack of opportunities available to minority
coaches causes former players and aspiring coaches to pursue ca-
reers outside of coaching. 50 One commentator has noted that, "[a]
person is more likely to pursue a particular career path if he or she
believes there is a chance for success." 1 ' It follows that a minority
player or coach would be more optimistic about his chances to ex-
cel as a coach if he saw other minorities succeeding in that posi-
tion.52 If other minorities do not succeed as coaches, however, the
phenomenon perpetuates itself; others will believe there is no op-
portunity for them to become successful coaches and abandon the
pursuit before it begins.
53
Because approximately half of all collegiate players are black,
the dearth of minority head coaches serving as mentors for the play-
ers they lead has an affect on the student-athletes as well.5 4 Com-
mentators have demonstrated the importance of having mentors
and role models that come from similar backgrounds. 55 Thus, it is
important to diversify head coaching so that student-athletes have
positive role models. 5
6
III. THE "ROBINSON" RULE
A. "C'mon the NFL is Doing it"
Many have urged the NCAA and its member schools to adopt
an equivalent of the NFL's Rooney Rule to address the lack of mi-
nority coaches in college football.57 Dr. Richard Lapchick sug-
tory/news/story?id=2325630) (listing which coaches were able to benefit from
time spent in NFL).
50. See Bridgeman, supra note 38, at 277 (describing cyclical effect of dearth
of minorities in coaching).
51. Id. (explaining rationale behind cyclical effect).
52. See id. (identifying source of motivation to pursue coaching career).
53. See id. (conveying repercussions of cycle). Collins explains that, on the
hiring side, there is a similar "catch-22": employers do not hire people from back-
grounds they are unfamiliar with, but familiarity with minorities will not increase if
minorities are not given an opportunity to coach. See Collins, supra note 2, at 884
(discussing factors contributing to social network theory).
54. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 5 (describing negative repercussions of lack
of diversity on student-athletes); Racial and Gender Report Card, supra note 8, at 12,
33 (listing racial breakdown of student-athletes by sport).
55. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 5 (highlighting benefit of positive role mod-
els); Maravent, supra note 33, at 272 (arguing that need for role models for stu-
dent-athletes is reason to adopt Rooney Rule).
56. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 5 (asserting reason for diversifying coach-
ing); Maravent, supra note 33, at 272 (encouraging employing diverse role models
for diverse students).
57. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 153-54 (describing efforts to adopted Rooney
Rule equivalent in collegiate football). There are a number of individuals and
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gested that the NCAA's equivalent of the Rooney Rule be called the
"Robinson Rule" after Eddie Robinson, the long time head football
coach at Grambling State University. 58
The Rooney Rule originated as a result of the pressure exerted
by civil rights attorneys, Johnnie Cochran and Cyrus Mehri.59 They
co-authored a report entitled "Black Coaches in the NFL: Superior
Performance, Inferior Opportunities," which applied statistical
analyses to demonstrate that black coaches in the NFL were being
held to a higher standard. 60 The attorneys threatened to sue the
NFL and its teams if the league did not take measures to correct the
disparity. 6 1 Cochran and Mehri suggested remedial measures that
the NFL could take, including the Rooney Rule. 62
organizations that have attempted to address the lack of diversity in head coaching
positions in collegiate football. See id. at 155-56 (noting groups that are involved in
sports in society issues). They include: the Black Coaches and Administrators, the
Institute for Diversity and Ethics in Sport at the University of Central Florida, The
Paul Robeson Research Center for Academic and Athletic Prowess at the Univer-
sity of Michigan, the Center for Equal Opportunity, and the Center for Study of
Sport in Society at Northeastern University. See id. (listing groups that have at-
tacked dearth of diversity coaching issue).
58. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 10 (asserting that NCAA needs Robinson
Rule).
In his fifty-seven years coaching the [Grambling] Tigers, Robinson won
over 400 games, eclipsing the legendary Bear Bryant of Alabama, and is
still the second-winningest college football coach of all time with an as-
tounding 408-165-15 record. Robinson sent over 200 players to the NFL,
including the first player from an HBCU to play in the NFL, Paul "Tank"
Younger, and four Pro Football Hall of Famers. Moreover, over eighty
percent of his more than 4000 players graduated. Today in college foot-
ball less than half of black student-athletes graduate. Despite his resume,
Robinson was never offered a head coaching position at a NCAA Division
I school.
Id. at 2-3 (summarizing career of Eddie Robinson).
59. See Ford, supra note 6, 1 11 (providing origins of Rooney Rule).
60. SeeJohnnie L. Cochran, Jr. & Cyrus Mehri, BLACK COACHES IN THE NFL:
SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE, INFERIOR OPPORTUNITIES 2-6 (2002) (summarizing Dr.
Madden's findings on diversity in sport). Cochran & Mehri's report argued that
the higher standard was discriminatory and that it dispelled the oft cited reason for
racial disparity in the NFL - the pipeline. See id. at 6 (explaining discriminatory
NFL standards for head coaches). The pipeline is "the particular set of jobs that
NFL head coaches usually have preceding their appointment as coaches." Madden
Report, supra note 42, at 7 (explaining pipeline is not sole explanation for under
representation of minorities). Madden dispelled the pipeline explanation by dem-
onstrating that teams required their minority coaches to be "better" than their
white colleagues to be hired and then more successful to avoid being dismissed.
See id (establishing inadequacy of pipeline justification).
61. See Collins, supra note 2, at 885 (describing Cochran and Mehri's
initiative).
62. See Cochran & Mehri, supra note 61, at 14-16 (suggesting remedial mea-
sures to diversify head coaching). Cochran and Mehri proposed that teams be
rewarded or penalized with draft picks based on their compliance with the rule.
See id. at 15-16 (recommending incentives and penalties).
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The NFL immediately responded by creating the Committee
on Workplace Diversity, which implemented a program to promote
diversity in hiring.63 The central focus of the program was a rule
that sought to increase diversity in the NFL's head coaching ranks
by requiring teams to interview one minority candidate each time
they conducted a search for a new head coach. 64 The Fritz Pollard
Alliance later nicknamed the "Rooney Rule" after Pittsburgh
63. See Press Release, National Football League, NFL Clubs to Implement
Comprehensive Program to Promote Diversity in Hiring (Dec. 20, 2002), available
at https://www.nfl.info/nflmedia/News/2002News/NFLDiversityProgram.htm
[hereinafter NFL Press Release I] (describing Committee's efforts); see also Collins,
supra note 2, at 886 (describing NFL's immediate response). Dan Rooney, the
owner of the Pittsburgh Steelers, chaired the Committee, while Arthur Blank, Pat
Bowlen, Stan Kroenke and Jeff Lurie, owners of the Atlanta Falcons, Denver Bron-
cos, St. Louis Rams and Philadelphia Eagles, respectively, served on it. See NFL
Press Release I, supra (listing owners on committee).
64. See NFL Press Release I, supra note 63 (outlining rule intended to pro-
mote diversity). The one exception to the mandatory interview is when a club
previously commits contractually to promote an assistant coach from its own staff.
See id. (explaining exception to general rule). The NFL issued guidelines to help
teams comply with the rule:
First, prior to beginning the interview process, a club should prepare a
job description that clearly and fully defines the role of its head coach
and the qualities it is looking for in its head coach. Second, prior to
beginning the interview process, clubs should prepare a 'search timeline'
that sets forth key decisions and dates leading up to the hiring of a head
coach. Third, as part of the search process, clubs should make certain
that they identify a deep and diverse-by many different criteria-pool of
head coaching candidates. Fourth, the Committee strongly believes that
direct involvement in the interviewing and selection process by a club's
principal owner is very important .... [W]e strongly urge owners to per-
sonally contact candidates and extend invitations to interview for a club's
head coaching position. Fifth, requests for permission to interview must
be made and documented in accordance with the [NFL's] Anti-Tamper-
ing Policy. Sixth, invitations to interview-whether accepted or de-
clined-should be documented directly by the club in a letter to the
candidate. Seventh, telephone interviews are never preferable and sel-
dom adequate. Eighth, it is not necessary that the same person interview
each applicant. Ninth, candidates who are invited to interview for open
positions should do so. Any widespread refusal... should be brought to
the attention of the [NFL] Commissioner or his senior staff. Finally, for a
range of reasons, we strongly question the value of head coaching
changes during the season. However, if a coaching change is made dur-
ing the season, the club may name an interim coach from its existing staff
for the remainder of the season without going through a formal inter-
viewing process. However, the club must follow the mandatory interview-
ing process in choosing a new permanent head coach.
Press Release, National Football League, NFL Issues Interviewing Guidelines (Dec.
9, 2003), available at http://origin.nfl.com/news/story/6908387 [hereinafter NFL
Press Release II] (providing guidelines so teams can comply with rule in good
faith). Shortly thereafter, Cochran and Mehri created the Fritz Pollard Alliance,
an affinity group designed to promote equal opportunity in the NFL, to ensure
that the NFL and its teams complied with the adopted recommendations. See Col-
lins, supra note 2, at 887 (noting that group could be plaintiff in Title VII action).
2010]
15
Hochbaum: And It Only Took Them 307 Years: Ruminations on Legal and Non-Leg
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
176 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Steelers owner and chair of the NFL Committee on Workplace Di-
versity, Dan Rooney. 65
If a team violates the Rooney Rule, the NFL has the power to
sanction the team's general manager and the team itself.66 The
power to discipline noncompliant teams makes the rule very effec-
tive. 67 Paul Tagliabue, former Commissioner of the NFL fined,
Matt Millen, general manager of the Detroit Lions in 2003 because
he failed to comply with the Rule while hiring head coach,
Steve Mariucci. 6s Since then, no team has dared to violate the
65. See Collins, supra note 2, at 886 n.89 (explaining naming of rule). In
describing Commissioner Tagliabue's selection of Dan Rooney as chair of the
Committee, Cummings said, "Tagliabue turned to the one NFL club owner who
had the clout and wherewithal to effectuate the kind of change needed to address
the race problem in the NFL. Dan Rooney . . . commanded respect amongst his
fellow owners. . . ." Cummings, supra note 3, at 118 (describing Rooney's qualifi-
cations to lead committee). Major League Baseball implemented its own diversity
policy before the NFL in 1999. See Walker, supra note 2, at 249 (explaining crea-
tion of guiding principles within Major League Baseball). The policy requires
teams to consider minorities for upper-level positions and each time a team hires a
new manger, it must submit a list of minority candidates to the league for review.
See id. (describing specific conditions of policy). The NFL recently expanded the
Rooney Rule to cover openings for team general managers and other front-office
positions. See Mark Maske, NFL Expands Rooney Rule to Cover Front-Office Hires, WASH.
PosT, June 16, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/
2009/06/15/AR2009061502806.html (describing application of mandatory inter-
view rule to front-office positions).
66. See Maravent, supra note 33, at 242 ("Commissioner Tagliabue made sure
to note that 'conduct inconsistent with procedural or substantive initiative relating
to equal employment opportunity may be treated as conduct detrimental' to the
NFL's Constitution and Bylaws, and therefore subject to punishment."); Ford,
supra note 6, 11 (clarifying commissioner's power to penalize teams that violate
rule); Collins, supra note 2, at 871 (detailing that NFL considers noncompliance
to be detrimental conduct and violation of league's constitution and bylaws).
67. See Ford, supra note 6, 1 11 (describing power to penalize).
68. See Maravent, supra note 33, at 243 (explaining background behind Mil-
len's fining); Ford, supra note 6, 1 11 (summarizing Tagliabue's punishment of
Millen). Millen's fining "provoked considerable criticism." Collins, supra note 2,
at 871. Critics found it particularly unfair that Millen was fined when he made a
concerted effort to interview a minority, but the minorities he reached out to de-
clined interviews. See Maravent, supra note 33, at 265-68 (illustrating why some
found punishment unreasonable).
Millen contacted five minority prospects regarding the Lions vacancy, but
all five refused his interview invitation because they knew that the deci-
sion to hire Mariucci had already been made. As Millen hastily continued
his search to conduct an obligatory minority interview, he worried that
Mariucci would receive other offers. Fearful that he would lose a hot
commodity, Millen decided to forego the Rule and signed Mariucci. Sub-
sequently, the NFL fined Millen $200,000, informing him of the penalty
in a letter from then commissioner Tagliabue. The correspondence
stated that "[w]hile certain of the difficulties that [Millen] encountered
in seeking to schedule interviews with minority candidates were beyond
[his] control, [he] did not take sufficient steps to satisfy the commitment
that [he] had made."
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Rooney Rule 69
The Rooney Rule has helped diversify head coaching in the
NFL.70 There are currently six minority head coaches in the NFL,
and since the Rule's enactment, there have been as many as seven
minority head coaches in the NFL at one time.7 1 Moreover, since
Collins, supra note 2, at 900-01 (describing less known background of Millen fin-
ing) (citations omitted). Others, however, have a different telling of the Millen
fining; Gene Upshaw, the executive director of the Players Association, said " [t]he
Detroit Lions gave mere lip service to the agreed-upon minority hiring process,
treating it almost as if a nuisance to their hiring of Steve Mariucci. The minority
candidates were never given a fair chance to interview. In this case, the Lions'
position is indefensible." Maravent, supra note 33, at 243 (quoting Associated
Press, Lions' Millen Fined $200K for Not Interviewing Minority Candidates, CBS.SPORTS
LINE.COM, July 25, 2003, http://cbs.sportsline.com/print/nfl/story/6498949).
69. See Louis, supra note 10, at 203 (describing impact of Millen's fining); See
Ford, supra note 6, at 11 (noting other teams subsequent full compliance).
70. See Collins, supra note 2, at 872 (describing Rooney Rule as not perfect
but successful); Nichols, supra note 6, at 5, 157-58 (summarizing impact of Rooney
Rule); Ford, supra note 6, 11 (discussing increased diversity among NFL head
coaches). Many believe that the Robinson Rule will be equally successful in diversi-
fying collegiate football. See Louis, supra note 10, at 205-06 (illustrating other po-
tential ways to diversify athletics). Some commentators believe that the Rooney
Rule has achieved unparalleled success. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 158-59
(describing incomparable achievement of rule); Collins, supra note 2, at 908-09
(noting that it is still controversial). Others, however, argue that the Rooney Rule
is not responsible for the increases in diversity seen around the league. See Nich-
ols, supra note 6, at 157 (highlighting contradictory opinions) (citing Mike Sando,
Levis Felling the Heat, Belichek a Cut Above, Feb. 12, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.
com/nfl/columns/story ?columnist=sandomike&id=3242034 (highlighting con-
tradictory opinions). "Those who subscribe to that view point out that eight of the
last nine hires in the NFL and sixteen of the last nineteen have gone to white
coaches and that one of the three recent minority hires was fired after only a single
season on the job." Id. at 158. Supporters of the Rooney Rule counter saying that
from 1950 to 2003, only six minorities were hired as NFL head coaches, but since
2003, eight minorities have been hired. See id. at 158-59 (arguing Rooney Rule is
responsible for increased diversification). Moreover, they argue that the rule has
led to an unprecedented amount of interviews for minority candidates allowing
them to break down barriers to previously all white networks. See Collins, supra
note 2, at 910 (mentioning previously all white head coaching network).
This author believes the success of the Rooney Rule needs to be viewed with cau-
tion. While it is undeniable that the rule has led to increases in the amount of
minority coaches hired, this author posits that the rule needs more time for its
effects to ripen before it can be called an unparalleled success.
71. See generally National Football League, http://www.nfl.com/ (last visited
Oct. 31, 2009) (containing information on minority head coaches of Cincinnati
Bengals, Indianapolis Colts, Pittsburgh Steelers, Chicago Bears, San Francisco
49ers and Tampa Bay Buccaneers); see also Ford, supra note 6, at 91 (discussing
representation of black coaches in NFL). Before the rule was enacted there were
two black coaches in the NFL and only five black coaches in the history of the NFL.
See Interview with Dr. Janice Fanning Madden, Professor of Sociology, Wharton
School of Business University of Pennsylvania, in Phila., Pa. (Mar. 2, 2009) [herein-
after Madden Interview]; NFL Report Card, supra note 42, at 18. Since the rule's
passing, teams hired ten new black coaches: Marvin Lewis, Lovie Smith, Romeo
Crennel, Dennis Green, Herman Edwards, Art Shell, Mike Tomlin, Jim Caldwell,
Mike Singletary and Raheem Morris. See National Football League, supra (supply-
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the rule's adoption, three black coaches led teams to the Super
Bowl; prior to the Rooney Rule, however, no minority coach ever
reached the Super Bowl.7 2 In the most recent Super Bowl, Mike
Tomlin, minority head coach of the Pittsburgh Steelers, became the
youngest coach ever, black or white, to win the Super Bowl.7 3
ing information concerning new hires within NFL); Cummings, supra note 3, at 27-
29 (noting impossibility of predicting how many would be hired without rule but
probability it would not be this many).
The rule has also increased diversity among assistant coaches and front-office exec-
utives. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 157 (showing changes to other positions as
result of rule). In 2001, twenty-eight percent of assistant coaches in the NFL were
black; in 2007, thirty-six percent of assistant coaches were black. See NFL Report
Card, supra note 42, at 19 (providing racial breakdown by position). Moreover, in
2008, the NFL had five black general managers, whereas in 2001 the league only
had two. See id. at 21 (illustrating vast difference in diversification of positions
between specified years). Nichols noted that New York Giants general manager,
Jerry Reese, became the first black general manager to win a Super Bowl. See Nich-
ols, supra note 6, at 158 (discussing significance of this milestone).
72. See Black Coaches and Administrators, Mike Tomlin Is Coach of the Week!,
Feb. 12, 2009, http://bcasports.cstv.com/genrel/021209aaa.html [hereinafter
Tomlin Coach of the Week] (illustrating impact of Rooney Rule); Black Coaches and
Administrators, Tomlin Becomes Youngest Coach to Win Super Bowl, Feb. 2, 2009,
http://bcasports.cstv.com/genrel/020209aaa.html [hereinafter Tomlin Youngest
Coach] (discussing Steelers' Super Bowl victory); Phil Taylor, Don't Discount Impact
of African-American Coaches, SI.coM, Jan. 31, 2007, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.
com/2007/ writers/phil_taylor/01/31/coaches/index.html (reporting on signifi-
cance of two black coaches reaching Super Bowl).
73. See Tomlin Youngest Coach, supra note 73 (remarking that President Obama
called Tomlin to congratulate him). Some tried to diminish Tomlin's success
when he was first hired, claiming that Dan Rooney, the rule's creator, was pres-
sured into hiring him. See Collins, supra note 2, at 909 (citing Were Others 'Ruled'
Out by Rooney?; Did the Rooney Rule Play a Part in Tomlin's Hiring as Steelers Coach?,
PrIr. POsT-GAzET-rE, Jan. 23, 2007, at D-1) (noting critics of Tomlin's accomplish-
ment); see also Tomlin Youngest to Win, supra note 73 (explaining how former
Steelers' assistant coaches Ken Wisenhunt or Russ Grim were expected to get posi-
tion). The media rumor was that Commissioner Goodell pressured Rooney to hire
Tomlin or Chicago Bears defensive coordinator, Ron Rivera. See Collins, supra
note 2, at 909 n.227 (citing Postir.g of Mike Florio to http://www.profootballtalk.
com/-16-07throughl-31-07.htm (Jan. 30, 2007) (tracing gossip that circulated as
result of hiring). Rooney, as well as Tomlin, deny the rumor. See id. (rejecting
rumor allegations). In talking about the role the Rooney Rule played in Tomlin's
hiring Rooney himself said:
To be honest with you, before the interview he was just another guy who
was an assistant coach. Once we interviewed him the first time, he just
came through and we thought it was great. And we brought him back
and talked to him on the phone and went though the process that we do,
and he ended up winning the job. [The rule] wasn't the most important
thing because he was the most important thing. Mike got the job because
he showed us his ability and showed us what he could do, and we believed
in him.
Cummings, supra note 3, at 126-27 (describing Rooney's involvement in hiring
Tomlin) (citing Greg Garber, Thanks to Rooney Rule, Doors Opened, ESPN.coM, avail-
able at http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/playoffs6/news/story?id=2750645).
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B. The NCAA Tries to Pull a Fast One?
Proposals suggesting that college football adopt a rule
equivalent to the Rooney Rule have met tremendous resistance.7 4
Brand has led much of that battle. 75 In opposing the Robinson
Rule, Brand asserted that the Robinson Rule could not be applied
to colleges and universities. 76 Specifically, he said that the NCAA
lacked the power to regulate whom its member institutions inter-
viewed and hired.77 While speaking before Congress, Brand al-
leged that the NCAA could not regulate its schools as such because
"they are not about to cede authority and give up their autonomy to
the NCAA . . . to dictate . . .who they will interview in coaching
.... ,,7 Moreover, he contended that independent monitoring of
schools' hiring practices was the best approach to achieve diver-
sity.7 9 Brand said that the BCA's Hiring Report Card acts as the
NCAA's "operational equivalent" to the Rooney Rule. s °
While speaking before Congress, Brand argued that the NCAA
could not impose the Robinson Rule on schools, however, he took
a different approach at the NCAA Convention: "Individual institu-
tions are wholly responsible for the hiring of coaches and adminis-
trators. That is as it should be. No outside body, such as the NCAA,
should usurp the authority or responsibility of universities and col-
74. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 160-63 (explaining that NCAA has most power
to invoke change but has not utilized it); see also Ford, supra note 6, at 12
(describing resistance from NCAA).
75. See Diversity Hearing, supra note 12 at 16-17 (noting resistance of potential
adoption of similar rule).
76. See id. (asserting that NCAA cannot control member schools in this
respect).
77. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 16 (limiting NCAA's control) (citing Myles
Brand, Presidents' Forum - Hiring in Athletics - Expect More Scrutiny if Diversity Data
Don't Improve, Apr. 23, 2007, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentlD=256)
(limiting NCAA's control; see also American Council on Education, House Subcom-
mittee Conducts Hearing on Diversity in College Coaching Ranks, ACENet.edu, Mar. 2,
2007 (reporting congressional hearing).
78. Diversity Hearing, supra note 12 at 15 (describing member schools'
position).
79. See id. (referring to independent "Report Cards").
80. NCAA Press Release, supra note 43 (applauding BCA's work). The BCA's
Hiring Report Card is supposed to make school's hiring processes more transpar-
ent and accountable. See Hiring Report Card, supra note 2, at 15 (expressing pur-
pose of report card). Nichols believes, however, that the hiring report cards do
little more than embarrass schools and do not have great promise to invoke
change. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 156 (disagreeing with accountability of report
cards). Floyd Keith admits that even though some schools are cooperating with
the BCA, minority hiring has not improved. See Hiring Report Card, supra note 2, at
10 (illustrating negative results).
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leges in hiring. '81 Both claims, however, are erroneous.8 2 The
NCAA, while being a voluntary association of schools, is a 'major
power in formulating rule changes and in setting and policing the
procedures under which members operate their football programs
'83 Consequently, the NCAA plays a fundamental role in regu-
lating the conduct of its member institutions, their employees, sup-
porters, and student-athletes. 84 Although, the NCAA regulates
broad areas of conduct such as academic eligibility, recruiting, and
scholarships, it also micro-manages member institutions by regulat-
ing the use of team logos, printing of student-athlete playing cards,
and acceptance of collect calls from recruits. 85 Therefore, the
NCAA refuses to regulate interviewing and hiring of coaches, not
because it does not have the authority, but because it is an unpopu-
lar initiative among its constituents. 86 The NCAA hides behind the
excuse of institutional autonomy, thus dodging responsibility.87
81. Nichols, supra note 6, at 161 (quoting Myles Brand, State of the Association -
'Citizens in a Civil Society', Jan. 15, 2007, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/
ncaa?ContentlD= 40976). Brand also said, "The NCAA only has the authority the
membership gives us, and the membership has not given us that kind of authority
- nor do I expect they will. That makes us dramatically different than the NFL."
Gordon, supra note 18, at 11 (quoting Tony Barnhart, Croom: Minority Hirings 'Can't
Get Worse, ATL. J. CONST., Feb. 19, 2008, http://www.ajc.com/uga/content/
sports/stories/2008/02/18/ncaa_0219. html).
82. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 161-62 (describing Brand's position as
shortsighted).
83. Id. at 149 (citing College Football Encyclopedia, Introduction: A Brief His-
tory of College Football, http://www.footballencyclopedia.com/cfeintro.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 31, 2009)).
84. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 11-12 (describing NCAA regulations as
"seemingly infinite"); see also Nichols, supra note 6, at 161-62 (summarizing NCAA's
regulatory power).
85. See generally The Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 2008-09 NCAA DxISION I
MANuAL (2008), available at http://uaw.ncaapublications.com/Uploads/PDF/Division__
_Manual_2008-09e9e568al-c269-4423-9ca5-16d6827c16bc.pdf (describing regulatory
power of NCAA). Gordon adds:
The NCAA arguably usurps the authority of its member institutions by
regulating everything from how long their teams can practice, to whether
and how they may give a game program to a recruit, to whether and how
they can go on foreign tours, to their postseason bowl licensing and fi-
nancial administration. The NCAA even keeps pace with technology, ex-
pediting its rule-making process to pass a ban on text messages from
coaches or recruits, updating the NCAA's existing limits on personal,
mail, and telephone contact.
Gordon, supra note 18, at 12 (providing examples of NCAA regulation).
86. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 12 (calling Brand's explanations "insin-
cere"); Nichols, supra note 6, at 161 (saying Brand is avoiding responsibility).
87. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 161 (asserting NCAA could regulate hiring
but is unwilling).
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Brand, however, was not the only leader of the fight against the
Robinson Rule.88 University presidents and athletic directors ob-
jected to the Robinson Rule as well. 89 T.K. Wetherell, the President
of Florida State University, said he was 'not sure you can legislate
morality.' 90 Kevin White, Duke University's Athletic Director, be-
lieved it would be difficult to administer the rule procedurally: "You
have public schools, private schools, different rules and regulations
in different states."91
Dutch Baughman, Executive Director of the Division I-A Ath-
letic Directors' Association, declared that the Robinson Rule was
contrary to 'institutional prerogative.' 92 Additionally, Baughman
asserted that the NCAA did not need a Rooney Rule equivalent, as
there was sufficient evidence of progress.93 He noted that the num-
ber of minority candidates interviewed for head coaching positions
jumped from two to twenty in two years. 94 There would have been
more, Baughman explained, had twelve candidates not declined
the opportunity to interview.95
Despite the resistance, in January of 2008, Baughman and the
Athletic Directors' Association issued guidelines for hiring head
coaches. 96 The guidelines, similar to the Rooney Rule, provide that
88. See id. at 153 (explaining reluctance of university presidents and athletic
directors).
89. See id. at 153-54 (noting that administrators seem unconcerned with
problem).
90. Id. at 154 (citing Wendell Barnhouse, Worst NCAA Football Score Ever: 5% of
Coaches are Black, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 17, 2008) (showing lack of
effort to support Robinson Rule).
91. Id. (including responses to proposed rule by presidents and athletic
directors).
92. Id. (citing Michael Rothstein, Groups Fight for College to Hire Minorities, FORT
WAYNE JOURNAL-GAzETtE, Dec. 16, 2007). Nichols explains that NFL owners al-
most certainly believed their institutional prerogative was being impaired when
adopting the Rooney Rule, but did so anyway. See id. at 154.
93. See id. (setting forth Baughman's position).
94. See id. (quoting Interview with Dutch Baughman, Executive Director of
the Division IA Athletic Directors' Association (May 27, 2008)). Brand reformu-
lated this data to show that between 2004 and 2007, seventy-six percent of FBS
schools interviewed at least one minority candidate. See id.
95. See id. (quoting Interview with Dutch Baughman, Executive Director of
Division IA Athletic Directors' Association (May 27, 2008)) ("Two years ago, there
were two minority candidates for a head football coaching position interviewed.
This past December, there were twenty candidates interviewed, six declined inter-
views, and six from the NFL declined interviews. The program is working, but we
still have much to do, two new minorities were hired.").
96. See Mark Maske, Diversity Rule Goes to College, WASH. PosT, Feb. 8, 2008, at
El, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/
02/07/AR 2008020704232.html (summarizing adopting of Athletic Directors' As-
sociation guidelines). Now, Baughman changed his tune and said, 'I really, truly
believe it's the right thing to do.' Steve Weiberg, Minority-Hiring Policy Stiffens for
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athletic directors, at Division I-A schools, should interview at least
one minority candidate while seeking to fill a head coaching va-
cancy.9 7 Additionally, the guidelines request that schools maintain
a list of diverse candidates, even when there is no vacancy.98 The
guidelines, however, fall short of the envisioned Robinson Rule be-
cause they lack an enforcement mechanism. 99 Without penalties
Major Football Programs, USA TODAY, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/
sports/college/football/2008-01-15-MinorityhiringN.htm.
97. See Maske, supra note 96 (identifying similarities of new guidelines to
Rooney Rule). The guidelines state:
Athletic Directors interviewing candidates for head football coaching po-
sitions should include, one or more minority candidates for that position,
resulting in a formal interview opportunity. It is prudent to hire from a
broad, diverse, and growing group of candidates, and to support equal
opportunity and fair hiring practices throughout the hiring process. This
is not only the position of the Association, but most likely in alignment
with the hiring policies of the institutions.
Division I-A Athletics Directors' Association, ACCEPTABLE STANDARDS 2 (2009),
available at http://i.usatoday.net/sports/college/football/fbc-minority-hiring-
guidelines. pdf [hereinafter Athletic Directors' Guidelines]. Nichols notes that the
policy uses the word "should" instead of "must" which allows athletic directors to
ignore the rule if they choose. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 156 (analyzing whether
guidelines create requirement or suggestion).
98. See Athletic Directors' Guidelines, supra note 97, at 1 (advising schools to con-
duct their program in accordance to proposed policy). This part of the guidelines
states:
Historically, the identification of candidates for a new search begins at
the start of the process, which potentially results in a less-than-compre-
hensive group of candidates. It is prudent to ensure a list of potential
candidates will include minority coaches. The development of the di-
verse group of candidates should be an on-going procedure during the
normal course of business throughout the year, and in particular, at times
other than when an actual search is underway. This on-going procedure
should enable the Athletic Directors to identify a more diverse group of
candidates, well in advance of when a search is necessary. Athletic Direc-
tors are encouraged to develop a list of potential candidates, to specifi-
cally include minority candidates, which will enhance the efficiency of a
search process, but will also give the Athletics Director more time to per-
sonally become better acquainted with those coaches identified as poten-
tial candidates, before an actual search is necessary.
Id.
99. See Maske, supra note 96 (explaining Athletic Directors' Association
Guidelines); Weiberg, supra note 96 (explaining policy has no penalty for noncom-
pliance). For further discussion of the Rooney Rule's enforcement mechanism,
see supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. Louis points out that the ability to
fine a university for violating the rule is critical because schools will not feel obli-
gated to comply otherwise. See Louis, supra note 10, at 203-04 (emphasizing impor-
tance of ability to penalize such conduct). Gordon adds that the rule lacks force
simply because the Athletics Directors' Association is an unknown relative to the
NCAA. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 11 (pointing out reason for weakness in
rule).
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for noncompliance, the Athletic Directors' Association's guidelines
are merely a suggestion. 00
The Athletic Directors' Association guidelines originated dur-
ing a meeting between the Fritz Pollard Alliance and Brand; again,
the Alliance urged the NCAA to adopt the Robinson Rule. 10 1
Brand directed the Alliance to work with Baughman and the ath-
letic directors in adopting an equivalent to the Rooney Rule. 10 2
The Athletic Directors' Association, however, is unable to punish
schools that refuse to comply with the rule. 10 3 It is unclear whether
the NCAA thought it could evade responsibility by pressuring the
Athletic Directors' Association into adopting the rule, specifically
because it does not have the power to penalize noncompliance. 0 4
Nevertheless, while the athletic directors have been congratulated
for "tak[ing] ownership of the issue," the rule has been, and will
likely remain, ineffective. 0 5
C. Criticism of the Rule
The Rooney Rule has its opposition. 0 6 It has been labeled
unfair, inefficient, flawed, subterfuge and reverse discrimina-
100. See Wieberg, supra note 96 (mentioning criticism of guidelines). Baugh-
man responded to suggestions that the guidelines were ineffective without penal-
ties by saying 'I have a lot more professional trust in our folks than that.' Id.
(describing Baughman's defense of guidelines).
101. See Maske, supra note 96 (providing background of guidelines'
inception).
102. See id. (describing Fritz Pollard Alliance's involvement).
103. See id. (addressing restriction of Athletic Directors' Association's power
to enforce guidelines). Collins interestingly discusses possible amendments to the
Rooney Rule that the NCAA could adopt that would not require punishment but
would still ensure compliance:
The [NCAA] could consider . .. implement[ing] an incentive-based sys-
tem rather than [a] . . . penalty-based rule, which substantially interferes
with [schools'] organizational autonomy. An incentive program could
provide an effective means of countering hiring biases with a minimum
of unintended collateral consequences while also eliminating the threat-
ening, commandeering nature inherent in a penalty-based system.
Collins, supra note 2, at 911 n.233 (considering amendment to Rooney Rule).
104. See Maske, supra note 96 (questioning motive behind NCAA's
inquisition).
105. See id. (discussing praise offered to athletic directors); Racial and Gender
Report Card, supra note 8, at 7; Hiring Report Card, supra note 2, at 10 (arguing
despite this recognition, rule is nevertheless unproductive).
106. SeeJay Nordlinger, Of the Rooney Rule, Classically Black, and Other Distinc-
tively American Outrages, NAT'L REx'. ONLINE, Sept. 2, 2003, http://www. nation-
alreview.com/impromptus/impromptus09O2O3.asp (acknowledging distaste for
rule); Hub Arkush, Honorable Intentions Aside, 'Rooney Rule' is Unfair, PRoFOOT-
BALLWEEKL.COM, Dec. 20, 2004, http://www.profootballweekly.com/PFW/ Com-
mentary/Columns/2004/harkush1924.htm (claiming rule is unreasonable); Eric
Edholm, Lions' President was Made Example of for NFL's Flawed 'Rooney Rule',
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tion.10 7 Much of the criticism focuses on whether it leads to sham
interviews.1 08 Critics believe that when teams already know who
they want to hire, interviewing a minority is a waste of time and
potentially embarrassing for the minority. 109 Lapchick counters
PRoFoOTBALLWEEKLY.COM, Aug. 1, 2003, http://www.profootballweekly.com/
PFW/ Commentary/Columns/2003/edholmO8l003.htm (disapproving of rule).
107. See Arkush, supra note 106 (noting perceived defects in rule);Edholm,
supra note 106 (criticizing Rooney rule); Collins, supra note 2, at 871-72; Cum-
mings, supra note 3, at 34 (describing critics' opinions). Proponents, however, are
adamant that the Rooney Rule is not reverse discrimination, but rather a widening
of the recruitment networks. See Shropshire, supra note 2, at 467 (predicting nec-
essary response to critics of affirmative action in sports). They emphasize that
there is no instruction to lower the standard of merit for the person being hired.
See id. at 467-68 (rebutting criticisms of Rooney rule).
108. See Nordlinger, supra note 106 (recognizing existing racial troubles de-
spite implementation of rule); Gordon, supra note 18, at 10 (recognizing sham
interviews); Maravent, supra note 33, at 248 (discussing interviews can be wasting
time for teams and interviewer); Collins, supra note 2, at 901-02 (criticizing Rooney
Rule); Duru, supra note 40, at 194-95 (explaining difficulty of ensuring team com-
plies with rule in good faith). Collins is critical of the rule and believes that it leads
to perfunctory interviews when a well-established candidate is under consideration.
See Collins, supra note 2, at 901-02. But a minority who otherwise might not have
been given the chance to interview previously may impress the decision-makers
and truly compete for the position despite his lesser-known status. See Gordon,
supra note 18, at 11 (theorizing origin of criticism).
Collins describes a story, which he believes demonstrates the weakness of the rule:
In a 2003 scheme illustrating the folly of the system, John Hackney, an
African American with an MBA from Cornell, offered to come and inter-
view with any NFL team for $100,000. While he had no interest in being
an NFL head coach, Hackney reasoned that he could pocket $100,000,
and the NFL team would have a net savings of $100,000 by complying
with the Rule and thereby avoiding a $200,000 fine such as the one issued
against Millen.
Collins, supra note 2, at 903 n.194 (citing Marianne M. Jennings, Rush Limbaugh:
Part I, JEWISH WORLD REv., Oct. 5, 2003, http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/
jennings 1011503.asp). It is clear, however, that a team that employed Mr. Hack-
ney's services would not be making a good faith effort at complying with the
Rooney Rule and would likely be fined anyway. See id. (defending Detroit Lions
actions in hiring Mariucci).
109. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 10 (giving Detroit Lions desire to hire Steve
Mariucci from outset as example); see also Collins, supra note 2, at 902 (arguing
that rule promotes tokenism); see also Cummings, supra note 3, at 35 (explaining
criticism of rule). The NCAA officially signed on to this position recently calling
mandatory interviews 'tokenism' and 'belittling.' Posting of Myles Brand to NCAA
Double-A Zone, http://www.doubleazone.com/2009/06/to-rooney-or-not-to
rooney-diversity-hiringcollege football.php#comments (June 5, 2009, 14:51
EST) (including Charlotte Westerhaus's thoughts regarding Rooney Rule). Col-
lins believes situations like the hiring of Bill Parcells by the Dallas Cowboys and
Nick Saban by the Miami Dolphins are the scenarios where the Rooney Rule fails.
See Collins, supra note 2, at 902 (demonstrating when rule is ineffective). Cum-
ming responds, however, by saying:
Those critics that claim that pro forma interviews by owners with majority
head coaching candidates in mind (i.e. Steve Mariucci in Detroit and
Bills Parcells in Dallas) badly miss the point of the Rooney Rule. Occa-
sionally, a minority candidate will eschew an interview opportunity for a
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that many of the minorities interviewed would not have had such an
opportunity without the rule.110 Additionally, he posits that teams
allow minorities to earn the job by impressing them, which is an
opportunity otherwise unavailable without the interview.111 Moreo-
ver, safeguards like the NFL's requirement that teams act in good
faith when complying with the Rooney Rule, protect against sham
interviews. 112
head coaching positions that seems predetermined to go to a majority
candidate. The decision to refuse an interview on this basis is short
sighted as well. The Rooney Rule is about exposure. The more an NFL
owner knows about a candidate, majority or minority, the more likely (or
unlikely) it is that that candidate will be hired by that owner in the future.
The hiring bias that existed (and still exists) in the NFL is based primarily
on lack of exposure. No interview, no matter how unlikely it will end in a
job offer, should be considered "sham" if a minority candidate is being
exposed to an NFL owner and that owner is becoming familiar with that
minority candidate.
Cummings, supra note 3, at 130 (responding to criticism of rule).
110. See Maravent, supra note 33, at 270-71 (measuring success of rule); see also
Collins, supra note 2, at 906 (declaring that process of interviewing minorities was
crucial); see also Duru, supra note 40, at 195 (explaining that rule leads to "mean-
ingful consideration" and breaking down of unconscious bias).
111. See Maravent, supra note 33, at 270-71 (crediting Rooney rule for in-
crease in minorities); Collins, supra note 2, at 904-07 (explaining how rule provides
opportunities for minorities and why challenges to rule will most likely fail).
Coaches are hurt by the absence of the Rooney Rule in college athletics because of
the increased visibility it provides minority candidates. See Nichols, supra note 6, at
161 (awarding credit to diversification that rule creates). Not only do minority
candidates get a chance to try and impress a school, but even if they do not get
hired initially, their name gets spread as a qualified candidate who warrants consid-
eration. See Collins, supra note 2, at 906-07 (noting that rule allows minorities to
develop reputation among decision-makers). Collins explains:
[T] here may be instances where a candidate - previously a specialist assis-
tant coach (i.e., linebackers coach) - interviews for a head coaching posi-
tion and winds up instead with an offer for a lower, but still highly
coveted, coordinator position (i.e., defensive coordinator). Accepting
the offer not only results in a promotion, but it significantly increases his
chances of becoming a head coach in the future.
Id. at 906-07 (footnotes omitted) (noting example of Jason Garret). This in-
creased visibility helps coaches whittle away at the perception that they are unquali-
fied and increases the odds of them being hired in the future. See Nichols, supra
note 6, at 159-60 (proposing benefits of increased visibility). That is how, Cum-
mings notes, the Rooney Rule "has significantly impacted the real and subcon-
scious barriers that had been erected as obstacles in the paths of African American
and minority coaches." Cummings, supra note 3, at 106 (discussing effect of
Rooney Rule).
112. See NFL Press Release II, supra note 64 (tracing steps necessary to comply
with rule). Even though teams are required to act in good faith, it is difficult to
actually monitor teams and schools in this regard. See Hiring Report Card, supra
note 2, at 32 (itemizing complexities of rule).
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IV. THE PROSPECT OF LITIGATION
A. Threats Made and Intentions Stated
When Johnnie Cochran and Cyrus Mehri submitted their re-
port to the NFL in 2002, they informed Commissioner Tagliabue
that unless the league acted soon, legal action would follow.
1 13
Floyd Keith, Executive Director of the BCA, made a similar threat
to the NCAA in 2007.114 The NCAA's response has been weak as it
lacks visible results.' 15 Therefore, it seems as though the NCAA has
called the BCA's bluff.1 16 Lapchick, however, believes that legal ac-
tion is imminent. 17 Regardless of whether legal action is immi-
nent, it is a real threat with potential for success.11 8
B. Title VII
Title VII provides a legal remedy for discriminatory hiring. 119
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act (the Act) in 1964 to eradicate
prejudice, hate, and discrimination in the United States. 120 Title
113. See Cummings, supra note 3, at 117 (addressing that Cochran and Mehri
did not make suggestion but rather, conveyed threat); Collins, supra note 2, at 885
(introducing Cochran and Mehri's threat of class action lawsuits). Collins notes
that the idea of Title VII suits against the NFL were considered even before Mr.
Cochran and Mr. Mehri threatened the NFL. See id. at 884 n.76 (discussing Sher-
man Lewis's inability to get interview). A group of black coaches discussed filing a
Title VII lawsuit after Sherman Lewis, the offensive coordinator for the 1995 Super
Bowl champion Green Bay Packers, could not get an interview for a head coaching
job. See id. (illustrating risk of potential litigation) (citing Jim Reeves, Op-Ed, Lewis
Merits a Chance at Cowboys Job, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 22, 1998, at D1).
114. See Maravent & Tario, supra note 33, at 45 (drawing similarity to previous
threat); Gordon, supra note 18, at 8 (discussing Keith and Lapchick's statements at
Congressional hearings); Ford, supra note 6, 1 1 (illustrating NCAA's lack of ac-
tion). 'I think it's pretty clear that embarrassment hasn't been enough. One of the
things we're thinking about is Title VII lawsuit.' See Maravent & Tario, supra note
33, at 45 (citing Associate Press, Lack of Black Coaches Lamented at Hearing, ESPN.
com, Mar. 1, 2007, available at sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2783335&type=
story). Keith also said that '[h]istory has proven that in order for any significant
progress to be made in eradicating a social injustice, legal action has been a cata-
lyst for change.' Gordon, supra note 18, at 8 (quoting Associated Press, Lack of
Black Coaches Lamented at Hearing, ESPN.coM, Feb. 28, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.
com/ncf/news/story?id=2783335).
115. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 161 (conveying NCAA response to legal
threat).
116. See id. (observing that NCAA barely responded).
117. See Ford, supra note 6, 9 (mentioning Lapchick's thought on potential
litigation).
118. See Maravent & Tario, supra note 33, at 48 (theorizing that if suit is not
successful it will at least pressure NCAA to consider best practices models).
119. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 6 (summarizing background of Title VII).
120. See id. (articulating purpose of Civil Rights Act); see also H.R. Rep. No. 88-
914, at 2 (1963). The other acts Congress passed to address employment discrimi-
nation include: the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006); the Age
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VII of the Act prohibits employer discrimination against employees
and potential employees.12' Employers may not discriminate on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin "with respect
to ...compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment . *..."122 Moreover, an employer may not use race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in a way that adversely affects an
employee's status or deprives an employee or potential employee of
an employment opportunity.1 23 Thus, the purpose of Title VII is to
"remov[e] ... artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to em-
ployment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on
the basis of racial or other impermissible classification."'' 24
The two types of discrimination recognized under the Act are
disparate treatment and disparate impact.125 Disparate treatment
occurs when an "employer simply treats some people less favorably
than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in
some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006); the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (2006); and the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (discussing provision of Title VII of
Act).
122. Id. (explaining language of statute). Subsection (1) states that it is un-
lawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
123. See id. (imposing restrictions on use of language). Subsection (2) states
that it is unlawful for an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." Id. Maravent & Tario explain the meaning of adverse employment action
by quoting case law:
To establish sufficiently adverse employment action, a plaintiff must show
a serious and material change in the terms, conditions or privileges of
employment. Although the statute does not require any direct economic
consequences, the employer's action must impact the terms, conditions
or privileges of the plaintiffs job in a real and demonstrable way, and the
asserted impact cannot be speculative and must at least have a tangible
adverse effect on the plaintiff's employment. [T]he employee's subjective
view of the significance and adversity of the employer's action must be
materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances.
Maravent & Tario, supra note 33, at 46 (quoting Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245
F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining adverse employment action stan-
dard) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
124. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (reasoning of Title
VII).
125. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 6 (explaining Title VII litigation).
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treatment."1 26 Disparate treatment is split into two categories: indi-
vidual and systemic. 127 Under individual disparate treatment, the
plaintiff coach must prove that he was treated differently because of
his race. 128 Under systemic disparate treatment, the coach must
prove that he was among a class of workers that were treated differ-
ently from another class. 129
The Supreme Court created a burden-shifting analysis for dis-
parate treatment cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.130
Under this analysis, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of
discrimination. 13 1 To make out a prima facie case for discrimina-
tion, the plaintiff coach must show: (1) that he was part of a pro-
tected class; (2) that he applied and was qualified for a coaching
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that despite
his qualifications he was rejected; and (4) that after he was rejected,
the coaching position remained open and the employer continued
to seek applicants that had the same qualifications. 132
126. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977) (defining disparate treatment and disparate impact) (citation omitted). See
generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (claiming viola-
tion of provision of Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (alleging employer discriminated against them
on basis of race); see also Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 248
(1981) (asserting claims based on circumstances in which plaintiff was denied pro-
motion and fired because of her gender); see also Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 39 F.3d 515, 519 (4th Cir. 1994) (asserting claim in connection with em-
ployer's promotion of less-senior white employee); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 527 (1993) (providing examples of employment action that
qualify include being hired, fired, promoted or demoted).
127. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 165 (laying out background of disparate
treatment analysis).
128. See id. (explaining potential Title VII claims for intentional
discrimination).
129. See id. (listing required elements for showing of systemic disparate treat-
ment). Systemic claims are often established with both statistics and anecdotal
evidence of discrimination. See id. (quoting Davis v. Valley Hospitality Servs., 372
F. Supp. 2d 641, 656 (M.D. Ga. 2005), affjd, 214 Fed. Appx. 877 (11th Cir. 2006)).
130. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
131. See id. at 802 (setting out elements of prima facie case).
132. See id. at 802 (naming elements under plaintiffs burden). In establish-
ing a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff serves to exclude the two
most obvious explanations an employer might proffer for denying a potential em-
ployee: lack of qualifications and open positions. See Maravent and Tario, supra
note 33, at 46 (explaining that framework is set up to require demonstration that
employment action was not taken for meritorious reasons). The elements in the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case can be adjusted for non-hiring situations that
involve discrimination. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506
(1993) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to discharge and demotion);
Tolbert v. Briggs and Stratton Corp., 510 F. Supp. 2d 549, 556 (M.D. Ala. 2007)
(implementing McDonnell Douglas framework in promotion context); Siddiqi v.
New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 353, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
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If the plaintiff coach meets this burden, then the defendant
university must provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its decision. 133 The school need not demonstrate that it was moti-
vated by this reason when it made the hiring decision. 3 4 Neverthe-
less, the university must proffer a reason that was available at the
time of hiring. 135 This burden is light because the defendant only
needs to offer a non-discriminatory reason, rather than prove that
the reason was its motivation.1 3 6 A college or university can point
to any number of legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not hir-
ing the coach; legitimate reasons may include "past coaching expe-
rience, recruiting ability, ability to connect with university sponsors
and donors, proven ability to handle the media [and] education
level attained.' 13 7
If the university meets its burden, the presumption of discrimi-
natory hiring will be rebutted.1 38 Once the defendant university
satisfies its burden of production, the coach may still prevail by
proving that the reason offered was pretext or that the university's
discriminatory intentions were more likely than not the motivation
(employing McDonnell Douglas framework in claim for discrimination in terms
and conditions).
133. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03 (detailing shifting burden).
Tire employer must present nondiscriminatory explanations, howcvcr, "[ t] hc de-
fendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the prof-
fered reasons." Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)
(citing Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978). Rather,
"[i]t is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to
whether it discriminated against the plaintiff." Id. Nevertheless, the defendant
must "produc[e] a reason that was available to it at the time of the decision's mak-
ing." Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, 36 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 1994). The Su-
preme Court temporarily shifted the burden of proof in establishing non-
discriminatory excuses and justifications to the employee in Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Antonio. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). The Court held that the burden of persua-
sion must remain with the plaintiff at all times and he must prove that the discrimi-
natory practice is attenuated from a business justification. See id. at 644 (noting
need for burden of persuasion). Congress, however, saw the holding as too limit-
ing and overruled it in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071 (1991). Thus, the Civil Rights Acts of 1991 reinstated the McDonnell Douglas
burden of proof structure. See id. (adopting structure of McDonnell Douglas).
134. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (explaining burden shifting). "The defen-
dant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered
reasons." Id. (quoting Bd. of Tr. of Keene State Coll. v. Sweeny, 439 U.S. 24, 25
(1978).
135. See Turnes, 36 F.3d at 1061 (requiring employers to produce reason that
was available to it at time of decision making).
136. See Perryman v. Johnson Prods. Inc., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th Cir.
1983) (deeming shifted burden for rebuttal as exceedingly light).
137. Nichols, supra note 6, at 170 (offering potential legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reasons for not hiring coaching candidate).
138. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 (detailing litigation tactics for Title VII suit).
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behind the decision. 13 9 If the university does not offer a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for rejecting the plaintiff, the trier of
fact may infer that it unlawfully discriminated against the coach. 140
A plaintiff coach may prove systemic disparate treatment if the
university maintains a policy that requires it to treat employees of a
certain class worse than others.1 41 Alternatively, and more com-
monly, systemic disparate treatment claims are established using
statistics that demonstrate the difference in treatment of a class of
which the plaintiff is a part.1 42 A plaintiff coach would use statistics
produced by expert testimony to prove that the university engages
in a pattern or practice of discrimination.143
Defendants in Title VII claims may assert an affirmative de-
fense to disparate treatment - the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion (BFOQ) .144 Employers may raise the BFOQ defense when
accused of discrimination based on sex, religion and national ori-
139. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253,
256 (indicating further options for plaintiff to prove claims of discrimination).
140. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (addressing
ability of fact finder to find intentional discrimination if defendant's contrary rea-
sons are rejected). A trier of fact is required to rule in the plaintiff's favor if he
satisfies the prima facie case and the defendant does not produce a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting her. See id. at 509 (stating court's responsi-
bility). If reasonable minds could differ on whether the plaintiff has demonstrated
the prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence, then the trier of fact
must resolve the question of fact. See id. at 509-510 (clarifying court's role in fac-
tual dispute).
141. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 167 (noting proposed liability under systemic
disparate treatment); see also Gordon, supra note 18, at 7 (setting forth plaintiff's
litigation options).
142. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 169 (introducing doctrine allowing statistical
proof of discrimination); see also, Gordon, supra note 18, at 7 (commenting that
usage of statistical analysis is common practice). Plaintiffs may use statistics to
prove the discriminatory effects of an employer's action in both systemic disparate
treatment and disparate impact claims. See Louis, supra note 10, at 188 (emphasiz-
ing use of statistics as litigation strategy) .
143. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 169 (describing necessary tools to use statisti-
cal proof in court); see also Gordon, supra note 18, at 7 (highlighting role of statis-
tics and statistical experts). A plaintiff may use direct or circumstantial evidence to
prove discrimination under Title VII. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983) (referencing applicable evidentiary rule for
plaintiff). Most Title VII plaintiffs, however, use circumstantial evidence due to
the difficulty of finding direct evidence. See Louis, supra note 10, at 187 (summa-
rizing common litigation practices).
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2008) (detailing that BFOQs necessary to
success of institutions are acceptable). The Act states that it is not unlawful "for an
employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or
national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of the particular business or enterprise . . . ." Id.
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gin, but not race or color.145 Consequently, universities and col-
leges may not utilize the BFOQ defense in a Title VII action
brought by a black coach claiming racial discrimination. 146
145. See Knight v. Nassau County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 649 F.2d 157 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(e)). The Court
has held that because "[r]ace is conspicuously absent from the exception; the bare
statute could lead one to conclude that there is no exception for either intentional
or unintentional racial discrimination." Miller v. Tex. State Bd. of Barber Exam'rs,
615 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1980). In the legislative history of the Act Senators
Joseph S. Clark and Clifford P. Case said of the BFOQ defense:
[It] is limited right to discriminate on the basis of religion, sex, or na-
tional origin where the reason for the discrimination is a bona fide occu-
pational qualification. Examples of such legitimate discrimination would
be the preference of a French restaurant for a French cook, the prefer-
ence of a professional baseball team for male players, and the preference
of a business, which seeks the patronage of members of particular relig-
ious groups for a salesman of that religion.
H.R. Doc. No. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 11 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964).
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2008) (providing BFOQ defense only in cases
involving discrimination on basis of sex, religion and national origin). Courts con-
sistently hold that customer preference, in this case the fan preference, is an inade-
quate rationale for asserting a BFOQ defense. See generally Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (alleging employer violated Civil Rights
Act by refusing to hire plaintiff because of his gender); Gerdom v. Continental
Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (claiming sexual discrimination be-
cause airplane policy required female flight attendants to comply with strict weight
requirements); Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994) (claiming law
school discriminated in application process on basis of race, sex and national ori-
gin); Rucker v. Higher Ed. AIDS Bd., 669 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1982) (contending
Higher Educational Aids Board fired him because he refused to obey his superiors
in their efforts to discriminate on racial and sexual grounds); Fernandez v. Wynn
Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981) (arguing employment discrimination be-
cause of her gender). The customer preference rationale is unacceptable because
courts recognize that the Act tried to alter customer prejudices. See Diaz, 442 F.2d
at 389 (explaining that it was goal of Act to overcome prejudices of sexual discrimi-
nation). The Fifth Circuit explained:
[I] t would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and
prejudices of the customers to determine whether. .. discrimination was
valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices the Act was
meant to overcome. Thus, we feel that customer preference may be
taken into account only when it is based on the company's inability to
perform the primary function or service it offers.
Id. Furthermore, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guide-
lines state that "the refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of co-
workers, the employer, clients or customers" does not warrant a BFOQ. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (2009). Consequently, an argument by universities and col-
leges that the discrimination was in response to fan preferences would quickly be
rejected as a BFOQ rationale, even if the Title VII claim were not race-based. The
burden of proof for the BFOQ defense lies with the employer. See Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (explaining burden of proof in
BFOQ case). There are two parts to the defense; to satisfy the first part, the em-
ployer must show that the purpose of the restriction is related to the "essence" or
.central mission" of the business. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,
203 (1991) (describing two prongs of defense). Thus, the employer must show
that sex, religion or national origin is essential to the performance of the job in
which the potential employee is being denied. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
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Disparate impact "involve[s] employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in
fact fall more harshly on one group than another."'147 The Su-
preme Court first construed the Act to proscribe disparate impact
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.148 The Court found that "practices, pro-
cedure, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of
intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices. '1 49 Therefore,
discriminatory employment practices, albeit unintentionally so, are
unlawful under Title VII. 150
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 122 (1985) (dissecting burden of proof for employer in
BFOQ case). To satisfy the second part, the employer must demonstrate that the
means used are closely related to the essence of the business; therefore, the em-
ployer must show that those excluded were unable to perform the job safely and
effectively, or that it would have been impractical to assess the qualifications of
those excluded on an individual basis. See W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S.
400, 414 (1985) (citing Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir.
1969)) (noting employees burden).
147. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, n.15 (1977). See
generally Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424 (alleging that employment practices violated Civil
Rights Act as employers conduct discriminated against black employees); Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (challenging height and weight requirements
and regulation establishing gender criteria for assigning correctional counselors);
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (defining meaning of dis-
parate impact in case setting). Disparate impact is important as a mechanism for
establishing liability because the prevalence of unconscious bias makes it difficult
to show discriminatory intent. See Collins, supra note 2, at 875 (explaining that
focus on intent does not address common discriminatory behavior). Therefore,
focusing solely on intent would be ill advised. See id. (concluding that beyond
intent, historical patterns of cultural or behavioral bias are significant).
148. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, the defendant employer instituted a pol-
icy requiring employees to have a high school diploma and receive satisfactory
scores on two aptitude tests in order to transfer between departments. See id. at
427-28 (disseminating fact of case). There was no evidence of intent to discrimi-
nate on the part of the employer, however, the policy served to exclude black
employees from transferring. See id. at 432 (opining that education requirements
in 1970's disadvantaged blacks from certain employment opportunities).
149. Id. at 430. The Court found that these neutral practices must be out-
lawed because "[t]he objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII ... was to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have oper-
ated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other em-
ployees." Id. at 429-30.
150. See id. at 429-31 (holding that employment practices must be nondiscrim-
inatory); see also Nichols, supra note 6, at 164 (explaining that requirements may be
found unlawful if excludes persons of certain racial group more than others). A
coach may find it difficult to bring a claim asserting social network theory is a Title
VII violation under disparate treatment and impact. See Ford, supra note 6, at 90
(discussing difficulty in prevailing on this claim). Ford explains that in EEOC v.
Consol. Serv. Sys., the Seventh Circuit found that 'word of mouth recruiting does
not compel and inference of intentional discrimination,' nor is it an employment
practice under disparate impact theory. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Consol. Serv. Sys.,
989 F.2d 233, 236 (7th Cir. 1994)). Ford notes, however, that there are "jurisdic-
tions that consider word of mouth recruiting and employment practice." Id.
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A plaintiff coach establishes a prima facie case under disparate
impact theory by showing that the defendant university uses an em-
ployment practice that causes a disparate impact.1 51 If the coach
makes out the prima facie case for disparate impact, then the uni-
versity will either attempt to rebut the claim or demonstrate that
the employment practice has a "manifest relationship to the job in
question."1 52 If the defendant university meets that burden, then
the coach has the opportunity to prove that the university could
have achieved the same purpose by alternative means that would
not result in one class suffering a disparate impact.153
C. Statistical Proof of the Prima Facie Case
Most commentators who have analyzed the black coaches' hir-
ing woes cite one statistic more than any other: 55% of student foot-
ball players are black, yet only 5% of their coaches are as well.1 54
Therefore, a plaintiffs ability to allege discrimination based on social network the-
ory will depend on what jurisdiction the suit is filed in. See id. (noting thatjurisdic-
tion is important in discrimination cases).
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (outlining burden of proof in disparate im-
pact cases).
152. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1281 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
The Supreme Court established business necessity, the affirmative defense to dis-
parate impact in Griggs. See 401 U.S. at 424 (articulating affirmative defense to
disparate impact). The Court developed this doctrine because "[t]he act pros-
cribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation." Id. at 431. Therefore, the employer must show that
the "employment practice" is "related to job performance," or else it "is prohib-
ited." Id. Business necessity is established by satisfying three requirements: "(1)
the practice must identify qualities that have a 'manifest relationship to the em-
ployment in question'; (2) the compelling business need of using the practice
must outweigh the discriminatory impact; and (3) there must be no other practice
that could accomplish the same business purpose with less discriminatory impact."
Leslie S. Gielow, Note, Sex Discrimination in Newscasting, 84 MICH. L. REv. 443, 467
(1985) (citations ommitted). Business necessity does not apply to instances of in-
tentional discrimination. SeeGarciav. Gloor, 609 F.2d 156, 163 (5th Cir. 1980), cert
denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981) (distinguishing business necessity defense from BFOQ
defense); see also Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Com., 494 F.2d 211, 244 (5th Cir.
1974), reh'gdenied, 494 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979)
(discussing employer's defensive burden of proof).
153. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. at 1281 (citing Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977)) (explaining employer's burden to prove plaintiffs
proof is inaccurate or insignificant); see also Gordon, supra note 18, at 8 (assessing
plaintiffs ability to argue that discrimination was not business necessity).
154. See Ford, supra note 6, at 88 (noting large discrepancy in representation
in race between students and coaches); see also Louis, supra note 10, at 190 (com-
paring, for example in 2006, proportion of black players to black coaches in col-
lege football); Hiring Report Card, supra note 2, at 11 (comparing representation in
collegiate football to representation in collegiate basketball and U.S. Army).
These statistics represent Division I-A. Other commentators frame the problem
starkly by pointing out that "only twenty-six minorities have ever held collegiate
head football coach positions among the several thousand times such a position
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While this statistic may help draw attention to the underrepresenta-
tion of black head coaches in collegiate football, it has no legal sig-
nificance when raised in a Title VII claim.1 55
Statistical proof of discrimination, however, will be critical to a
coach's Title VII case against a university. 156 Consequently, during
litigation, there will undoubtedly be debate over what is the appro-
priate applicant pool from which head coaches are selected.157 De-
termining the parameters of the applicant pool is important in any
employment discrimination case because a plaintiff can make out
the prima facie case for intent to discriminate simply by showing
that the plaintiffs class is severely underrepresented relative to the
class's representation in the local labor force.' 58
To determine whether there is a statistically significant dispar-
ity, the court must first decide if the position at issue should be
classified as an unskilled or skilledjob. 159 If the job is unskilled, the
court must compare minority representation in the employer's
workforce to minority representation in the area labor market or
general population. 160 If the position is skilled, however, the court
has opened since 1869 (or even since the NCAA was formed in 1910)." Nichols,
supra note 6, at 170. Although this statistic is not completely up to date, even if it
were, it could not be used because the relevant periods of hiring that must be
analyzed are those subsequent to the passing of Title VII.
155. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 7 (arguing that underrepresentation of
black coaches has social significance but not legal significance); Collins, supra note
2, at 895 (explaining that players and coaches occupy distinct labor markets). Part
of the problem with relying on this statistic is that not every athlete becomes a
coach, nor does every athlete desire to. See Shropshire, supra note 2, at 458 (mea-
suring validity of statistic). In Teamsters, the Court used the general population as a
control group for statistical comparison. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, (1977) (noting general public as appropriate). In Hazelwood,
however, the Court found that when skilled positions are at issue, the general pop-
ulation was the inappropriate control group. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 313 (opin-
ing need for more specific control group). Consequently, in Hazelwood the parties
fought over what would be considered the appropriate group. See id. at 313 (hold-
ing that statistical data concerning labor market area should have been included).
Therefore, the Court determined that in cases involving skilled positions the ap-
propriate control group is the qualified labor market. See id. at 313 (explaining
proper analysis). Either way students are the wrong control group because they
are not even in the labor market. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 324 (cau-
tioning that statistical data can be counterproductive if not sufficiently related to
case at hand).
156. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 338 (concluding that statistics have
valued role in discrimination cases); Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08 (emphasizing
ability of statistics to provide proof in employment discrimination suits).
157. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 310-11 (outlining that what statistics prove de-
pends on information against which they are analyzed).
158. See id. at 311-12 (establishing relevant labor market test).
159. See id. at 309, n.13 (distinguishing skilled position of teaching in present
case from unskilled position of driving trucks in prior case of Teamsters).
160. See id. (requiring that comparison must be drawn to like populations).
[Vol. 17: p. 161
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must compare the percentage of minorities in the defendant's
workplace with the number of qualified employees in the area labor
market. 6 1
Undoubtedly, head coaching would be considered a skilled po-
sition, but many commentators differ in their opinions as to which
candidates within the coaching world should be considered quali-
fied.162 Bridgeman simply defined the employment pool as all
coaches nationwide that are qualified to be head coaches.1 63
Hannah Gordon and Daniel Louis believe that it should include all
assistant coaches. 164 Dr. Janice Madden contends that the pool
should be defined by objective performance data that would indi-
cate that an assistant coach or coordinator could succeed as a head
coach. 165
While possible, it is unlikely that a court would force the plain-
tiff coach to use local labor force data and not allow the coach to
use the national coaching labor market as its relevant comparison
group.1 66 Consequently, a plaintiff might need to compile statisti-
cal data of the hiring practices of the individual defendant
school. 167 That data, however, may be difficult to ascertain and in
some cases, such data may be nonexistent. 168
161. See id. (opining that if defendant is skilled worker he must be compared
to workers with comparable skills).
162. See Bridgeman, supra 38, at 262 (exploring what qualifies coach to be-
come head coach); Gordon, supra note 18, at 7 (speculating on comparison
group); Louis, supra note 10, at 190 (discussing gateway positions to head
coaching).
163. See Bridgeman, supra note 10, at 262 (asserting belief for appropriate
labor market comparison).
164. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 7 (narrowing inclusion of assistant coaches
because more black men are included).
"[T]he labor market for college head coaches primarily consists of assistant
coaches; the pool of assistant coaches is 23% African-American so we expect in a
nondiscriminatory 'ideal treatment' world that 23% of head coaches would be Afri-
can American." Id.; see also Louis, supra note 10, at 172, 190 (noting that in 2005
this was 26.52% of pool). Walker wrongly suggested that the appropriate compari-
son group would be head coaches in other sports. See Walker, supra note 2, at 255
(arguing that proportion of minority coaches in baseball would be compared to
NBA and NFL in suit against MLB).
165. See Madden Interview, supra note 72 (illustrating how performance data
can be used to assess who will succeed as head coach).
166. See Louis, supra note 10, at 192 (evaluating possible outcomes of statisti-
cal approach in court).
167. See id. (explaining alternative discovery method).
168. See id. (noting that employers often do not maintain data of hiring pro-
cess). Madden explains, however, that this can work against the employer because
"employers are often hurt when they do not maintain hiring data." Madden Inter-
view, supra note 72.
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If a court limits the plaintiff coach's use of available statistical
data, the coach may need to look beyond hiring data to prove dis-
parate treatment. 169 Included in Cochran and Mehri's report to
the NFL was a report by Dr. Madden, entitled "Differences in the
Success of NFL Coaches by Race, 1986-2001: Evidence of Last Hire,
First Fire" (Madden Report). 170 The Madden Report statistically
analyzed win and loss data during the relevant period for coaches
who served their team for a full season.' 71 Madden concluded that
from 1986 to 2001 black coaches outperformed their white counter-
parts, averaging more than nine wins, as compared to eight by
white coaches.' 72 Madden emphasized that this was particularly im-
portant because teams with nine wins were much more likely to
make the playoffs than teams with eight.' 73 This disparity led to
sixty-nine percent of teams with black coaches making the playoffs,
as opposed to forty percent of teams with white coaches. 174
Furthermore, Madden found that black coaches who were
fired performed better in their final season than white coaches who
169. See Louis, supra note 10, at 192 (providing alternate methods of proof).
170. Cochran and Mehri, supra note 61, at 2-6 (including Madden Report to
demonstrate discrepancy in treatment).
171. See Madden Report, supra note 42, at 8 (analyzing performance data).
172. See id. at 15-16 (explaining that during relevant period black coaches had
better record than white coaches). Madden's study controlled for team quality to
demonstrate that black coaches were not only succeeding because they had better
teams. See id. at 13-14. (finding Black coaches performed just as well as white
coaches). She controlled for quality through previous records and team payroll.
See id. (discussing methodology of Madden's analysis). Duru explains that from
this data "Mehri and Cochran did not conclude that black head coaches were
somehow inherently better than white head coaches. Rather, they concluded that
because barriers to entry were formidable for black coaches seeking head coaching
positions than for white coaches, the black coaches able to surmount those barri-
ers were exceedingly well equipped to succeed as head coaches." Duru, supra note
40, at 188 (reviewing findings in Cochran and Mehri report). See also Madden
Report, supra note 42, at 9 (comparing season records). Madden also demon-
strated that black coaches performed better in their first season as head coach
than white coaches. See id. at 11 (comparing winning percentages of coaches from
both races). Black coaches won an average of 9.6 games in their first season,
whereas white coaches won 7.1 games in their first season. See id. at 10 (examining
statistical facts). Seventy-one percent of black coaches made the playoffs in their
first season, while only twenty-three percent of white coaches did. See id. (drawing
attention to black coach's superior playoff percentages).
173. See id. at 9 (highlighting importance of having nine wins during football
season). "[D]uring this time period over 60% if teams with exactly nine wins made
the playoffs, but less than 9% of those with eight wins did so." Id.
174. See id. at 9-10 (drawing attention to discrepancy in tendency to reach
playoffs). "All of the African American coaches have made it to the playoffs, but
only 48 of 77 White coaches made it to the playoffs between 1990 and 2002." Id. at
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were fired. 175 Black coaches averaged 6.8 wins in their final season
before being fired, where as white coaches averaged only 5.5
wins.176 Moreover, twenty percent of fired black coaches made the
playoffs in their final season, but only eight percent of white
coaches did the same. 177
Ultimately, Madden concluded that the numbers were consis-
tent with higher expectations for black coaches. 178 Therefore, al-
though hiring data for a lawsuit brought by a minority coach might
be unavailable, performance data might suffice. 179 If the results in
the Madden Report exist in college football and minority coaches
are being held to a higher standard, then this constitutes evidence
of employment discrimination. 80 Either way, a plaintiff who but-
tresses anecdotal evidence of discrimination with statistical evi-
dence of systemic disparate treatment will greatly improve his odds
of success.' 81
175. See id. at 9, 11-12 (demonstrating that black coaches performed better in
their last season with team). Madden noted that because she had data for all the
coaches that could be fired in a season, it permitted her to perform a more direct
test to determine whether black coaches were more likely to be fired based on
their performance. See id. at 12 (utilizing accurate data). She concluded that "Afri-
can American coaches are significantly more likely to be fired than White coaches,
controlling for their regular-season performance and their time with their teams."
Id.
176. See id. at 11-12 (contending that blacks had to perform better to avoid
dismissal).
177. See id. at 12 (comparing playoff achievements of black and white
coaches). If this phenomenon were to exist in college football a coach could bring
a Title VII action for discriminatory firing. Many believe that Ty Willingham was
subject to such treatment during his dismissal from Notre Dame. See Gary Norris
Gray, Tyrone Willingham vs. Charlie Weis: An Honest look at Notre Dame Football Three
Years Later, BLACKATHLETE.NET, Oct. 25, 2008, http://blackathlete.net/artman2/
publish/ CollegeFootball_22/TyroneWillinghamVsCharlieWeis.shtml (spec-
ulating possible reason for Willingham's dismissal).
178. See Madden Report, supra note 42, at 15 (discussing findings). Madden
cautioned that her sample size was small. See id. at 12 (detailing parameters of
analysis). Nevertheless, a small sample size may independently be proof of discrim-
inatory intent because with less minority head coaches it will be easier to demon-
strate legally significant disparities. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 341-42 n.23 (finding that when statistical data is so small that signifi-
cant findings cannot be made it is in and of itself proof of discriminatory intent as
"inexorable zero").
179. See Duru, supra note 40, at 188 (advocating for multiple strategies using
statistics). Madden used win-loss data, which was and always will be readily availa-
ble. See generally Madden Report, supra note 42 (analyzing performance through
team records).
180. See Duru, supra note 40, at 188 (asserting evidence in Madden's report
will suffice in Title VII claim).
181. See id. at 188 (describing NFL's response to statistical evidence).
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D. Title VII Myths
Many commentators have wrongly assumed that a Title VII ac-
tion brought by a coach will fail without "smoking gun evidence."'182
The odds of a case having direct evidence, such as an athletic direc-
tor explaining to a minority candidate that he was not hired be-
cause of his race, are unlikely.' 83 Employers, including those in
collegiate athletics, have become more careful and do not leave
"smoking guns" lying around. 184 Nevertheless, the McDonnell Doug-
las framework allows plaintiffs to prove a prima facie case of intent
to discriminate without such evidence. 185 Moreover, as noted
above, statistical data can be used to prove a prima facie case of
intent to discriminate. 186 A plaintiffs burden to prove a prima fa-
cie case of discrimination is not difficult and can be done without
any "smoking gun evidence. 1 87
Another misconception of Title VII requirements is that a dis-
parate impact claim by a coach will fail because schools do not use
standardized hiring practices when hiring coaches. 18 8 As a result of
the decision in Watson v. Forth Worth Bank & Trust, disparate impact
theory is not limited to objective hiring practices, but also applies to
182. See Louis, supra note 10, at 187 (noting that candidate who was not for-
merly employed by school will have little or no evidence of discriminatory animus
or deliberate treatment because he simply has not had substantial relationship
with that school); Ford, supra note 6, at 98, 102 (explaining that it would be hard
to proceed on disparate treatment claim without evidence of deliberate discrimina-
tion); Maravent and Tario, supra note 33, at 48 (quoting Telephone Interview with
Temple University Beasley School of Law ProfessorJeremi Duru (Mar. 20, 2007));
Walker, supra note 2, at 253 (instructing that it will be extremely difficult to prevail
without explicit comments).
[M]ore often than not, employment discrimination plaintiffs do not have
iron clad, smoking gun . . . evidence. At best, an applicant might have
evidence of what the Court calls a 'stray remark' ..... [S] tray remarks...
are far from dispositive. Because of the limited probative vale given to
stray remarks an the sheer lack of other substantial evidence for a Black
applicant head coach, it is very difficult to prove even a prima facie case
of intentional discrimination in a failure-to-hire situation.
Louis, supra note 10, at 191-92 (arguing that disparate impact claims are best).
183. See Ford, supra note 6, at 90 (citing Steve Weiberg, Black Coaches Associa-
tion Will Use Title VII as Tool in Encouraging Diversity in NCAA, USA TODAY, Sept. 5,
2006, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2006-09-05-title7ncaa x.
htm) (reporting Black Coaches Association plans to use Title VII to increase diver-
sity with NCAA).
184. See Louis, supra note 10, at 187, 191 (discussing improbability of finding
direct evidence).
185. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
187. See Maravent and Tario, supra note 33, at 46 (analyzing McDonnell Douglas
framework); Collins, supra note 2, at 894 (describing burden as light).
188. See Ford, supra note 6, at 97 (asserting disparate impact claims can chal-
lenge validity of only objective tests).
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subjective hiring practices.' 89 Therefore, a black coach alleging dis-
parate impact could assert that the university's subjective hiring
practices have a disparate impact on qualified minority candi-
dates. 190 This is particularly important because diversification of
the coaching ranks may require an objectification of hiring
procedures.191
E. Jackson v. University of New Haven as Guidance
In 2002, the United States District Court of Connecticut de-
cided Jackson v. University of New Haven.1 92 James Jackson, a football
coach who applied for the head coach position at the University of
New Haven, brought Title VII claims for disparate impact and dis-
parate treatment. 193 When advertising the position, the University
listed "successful collegiate coaching experience" as a require-
ment.' 94 Additionally, the University required "experience in
recruiting, game coaching and knowledge of NCAA rules and regu-
lations."'195 Jackson was one of thirty-six applicants for the head
coaching position at the University.' 9 6 He previously served as a
minor league professional football coach.19 7 His credentials also in-
cluded multiple "coach of the year" honors in minor league profes-
sional football, as well as induction into the Minor League Football
Hall of Fame. 198 When the University chose six semi-finalist candi-
dates, all of whom were white, Jackson was not included.' 99
In the suit, Jackson argued that the requirement of collegiate
coaching experience had a discriminatory effect on African Ameri-
cans and thus, constituted disparate impact discrimination. 20 0 Ad-
189. 487 U.S. 977, 989-92 (1988) (holding disparate impact can be applied to
subjective practices). This was a significant ruling 'because otherwise employers
could avoid application of the theory by simply replacing objective employment
practice with subjective decision-making, which could be tainted just as, much by
subconscious stereotypes and prejudices.' Louis, supra note 10, at 189-90 (quoting
GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF EQUALITY IN
THEORY AND DoGrRINE 79 (2001)).
190. See Louis, supra note 10, at 190 (explaining potential disparate impact
claim for subjective practices).
191. For a further discussion of diversification of coaching, see infra notes
307-35 and accompanying text.
192. 228 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Conn. 2002).
193. See id. at 158-59 (detailing plaintiff's allegations).
194. Id. (noting New Haven's specified criteria).
195. Id. (listing more of New Haven's required criteria).
196. See id. at 157 (describing New Haven's search process).
197. See id. at 157-58 (summarizing Jackson's experience and qualifications).
198. Id. at 158 (providing Jackson's background and qualifications).
199. See id. (summarizing narrowing of pool of candidates).
200. See id. at 158-59 (outlining summary judgment standard).
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ditionally, as part of his disparate treatment claim, Jackson asserted
that the University intentionally discriminated against him because
of his race.20 1 The district court, however, granted the University's
motion for summary judgment on the disparate treatment claim
because Jackson failed to meet two of the four elements of the
prima facie case in McDonnell Douglass.20 2 The court found Jackson
unqualified for the position and gave the University broad defer-
ence in establishing qualifications for its employees. 20 3 Further-
more, the court held that the plaintiff must show that hiring criteria
were established in bad faith for them to be found unreasonable. 20 4
The district court ruled in favor of the University on the dispa-
rate impact claim as well. 205 The court found Jackson's statistical
evidence unpersuasive. 20 6 It pointed to Jackson's "exceedingly
201. See id. (providing basis for Jackson's disparate treatment and impact
claims).
202. See id. at 162 (finding court could not equate minor league experience
with collegiate coaching).
203. See id. at 161 (explaining whyJackson did not meet prima facie showing).
204. See id. (stating that there was no evidence of disparate treatment).
[T] he district court gave deference to three cases: Thornley v. Penton Publishing,
104 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 1997); Schaffner v. Glencoe Park District, 256 F.3d 616 (7th Cir.
2001); and Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2000).
In Thornley, the Second Circuit defined the term "qualified" as "the criteria
the employer has specified for the position. Absent a showing by the plaintiff that
the employer's demands were made in bad faith . . .an employer ... is not com-
pelled to submit the reasonableness of its employment criteria to the assessment of
either judge or jury." The Schaffner court determined that "[w] hat the qualifica-
tions for a position are, even if those qualifications change, is a business decision,
one courts should not interfere with. We do not tell employers what the require-
ments for ajob must be." Finally, in Howley, the Second Circuit determined that a
city was "entitled to set its own criteria" for the position of assistant chief, in that it
deemed four years of line-officer experience necessary, which the applicant-plain-
tiff did not possess.
Maravent and Tario, supra note 33, at 48 (discussing precedent cited by Jackson
court).
205. See Jackson, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 163-64 (explaining shifting burden analysis
under disparate impact).
206. See id. (finding Jackson's disparate impact claim failed). Jackson prima-
rily referenced many of the same statistics that would be included in a likely Divi-
sion I FBS Title VII action, including the lack of diversity amount college football
coaches across all NCAA divisions and that the University of New Haven applicant
pool demonstrate a causal link between the prior experience requirement and its
impact on African Americans. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 24 (indicating possible
need to focus on employer's practices). Gordon mentions that a few high school
coaches filed Title VII claims but most of them lost on summary judgment. See
Gordon, supra note 18, at 8-9 (examining frequency of summary judgment against
coaches). These cases are: Hardman v. Board of Education of the Dollarway, Arkansas
School District, 714 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1983); Lujan v. Franklin County Board of Educa-
tion, 766 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1985); Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education , 712
F.2d 1377 (11th Cir. 1983); Autry v. Nassau County School Board, 2006 WL 1232812
(M.D. Fla. 2006); Wilkerson v. Columbus Separate School District, 985 F.2d 815 (5th
Cir. 1993); Riley v. Birmingham Board of Education, 154 F. App'x 114 (lth Cir.
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small sample" size as the reason that a causal connection could not
be established between the University's hiring practice and discrim-
inatory effect. 20 7
F. The Perfect Plaintiff
The Jackson case demonstrates the difficulty of winning a Title
VII suit without the right plaintiff.20 8 Part of Jackson's problem was
that the court did not consider him qualified for the position,
which meant he could not establish a prima facie case under Mc-
Donnell Douglas.209 An ideal plaintiff would have head coaching ex-
perience at the collegiate or professional level.210 Prior experience
in head coaching would demonstrate that he was at least minimally
qualified at another institution and would allow his success at that
school to be assessed to prove that he was qualified for the position
at the defendant school. 211
2005). See Gordon, supra note 18, at 8-9 n.38. (providing examples of failed Title
VII claims).
207. See Jackson, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 164 (criticizing Jackson's statistical
findings).
If it is assumed that the number of applications for the New Haven posi-
tion was roughly the same as the ordinary head college football position
at a comparable university, the court appears to faultJackson for bringing
a Title VII action related to a position for which statistical information is
ordinarily "exceedingly small." A built-in bias for employers of a small
number of employees - for whom the statistical sample is likely to always
be undersized - cannot be what the Griggs court had in mind when hold-
ing that a statistical analysis can be an important component of a dispa-
rate impact case.
Nichols, supra note 6, at 24-25 (evaluating Jackson Court's analysis).
208. See Maravent and Tario, supra note 33, at 48 (discussing potential Title
VII suit). This section examines the ideal plaintiff in respect to discriminatory
hiring, however, a plaintiff may also bring a claim based on discriminatory pay. See
Louis, supra note 10, at 181-83 (providing evidence that black college football
coaches are compensated at significantly lower level than white coaches along with
being paid less than NCAA average). The remedial statute for discriminatory pay
is the Equal Pay Act. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Louis explains that the average salary for
a Division I-A head football coach in 2006 was $950,000.00. See Louis, supra note
10, at 181 (citing Jodi Upton & Steve Wieberg, Contracts for College Coaches Cover
More than Salaries, USA TODAY, Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/
college/football/2006-11-16-coaches-salaries-cover_x.htm). The average salary of a
black head football coach in Division I-A was $833,754.40 in 2006. See id. at 182.
That is a difference of $116,245.60. See id.
209. For a further discussion of the McDonnell Douglas case, see supra notes
202-205 and accompanying text.
210. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 26 (explaining requisite need for qualifica-
tions to meet burden); Louis, supra note 10, at 186 (assessing advantages of plain-
tiff with head coaching experience).
211. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 26 (emphasizing that past experience would
provide coaching candidate with valuable statistical evidence); Louis, supra note
10, at 186 (discussing fact that prior head coaching experience indicates certain
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The willingness of potential plaintiffs to legal action also com-
plicates advocates' intentions of effecting change through the
courts.2 12 Lapchick contends all that is needed to be successful is
the "right case.., backed by a discriminated coach willing to take a
stand. ' 213 Lapchik and Duru, however, recognize that finding a
willing plaintiff is difficult because a coach by bringing a lawsuit
risks losing his coaching career.214 Commentators believe that a
coach who pursues legal action against a college or university will
be ostracized. 215 Consequently, the position of coaches who might
consider bringing Title VII claims is akin to that of
whistleblowers. 216 Additionally, the problem of finding a potential
plaintiff is further compounded by the fact that most coaches likely
are unaware of Tide VII's provision outlawing employer retaliation
for reporting discrimination. 21 7
level of qualification). Measurements of success might include team record, as
well as recruiting data. See id. (noting which data might be helpful).
212. See Maravent, supra note 33, at 48 (reflecting upon complications of
bringing lawsuit).
213. American Council on Education, supra note 78 (reporting Lapchick's
comments from congressional hearing). In discussing the possibility of legal ac-
tion, Robert Clegg, president and general counsel of the Center for Equal Oppor-
tunity said:
What you would have to do is pick out a particular college and say, all
right . . . they've never hired an African American as a head coach.
There've been plenty of African American individuals who have applied,
and their qualifications are better than (those of) the people who were
actually hired.
Ford, supra note 6, at 91 (citing Steve Wieberg, Black Coaches Association will Use Title
VII as tool in Encouraging Diversity in NCAA, USA TODAY, Sept. 5, 2007, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2006-09-05-title7ncaa_x. htm).
214. See Maravent & Tario, supra note 33, at 48 (noting potential effect on
coach's career); see also Louis, supra note 10, at 186-87 (discussing feared "stigma"
associated with bringing suit for discrimination); Walker, supra note 2, at 261-63
(detailing what happened to Curt Flood after he brought suit against MLB).
215. See Maravent & Tario, supra note 33, at 48 ('A coach could, as a result of
such an action, be black-balled in coaching circles, a la Curt Flood, which hurt his
coaching opportunities.') (citing Telephone Interview with Temple University
Beasley School of Law ProfessorJeremi Duru (Mar. 20, 2007)); Nichols, supra note
6, at 26; Louis, supra note 10, at 186 (noting that coach will want to avoid being
labeled 'The Coach Who Sued Because He Was Not Hired'); Gordon, supra 18, at
8 (explaining that filing claim is risky for coach).
216. See generally Marci Alboher Nusbaum, Personal Business; Blowing the Whis-
tle: Not for the Fainthearted, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, available at http://www. ny-
times.com/2002/02/10/business/personal-business-blowing-the-whistle-not-for-
the-fainthearted.html (explaining that hero treatment given to Enron
whistleblower Sherron Watkins is far from ordinary).
217. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). The anti-retaliation provision
provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discrimi-
nate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . .be-
cause her has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
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Jackson brought his claim before the movement to diversify
coaching was well organized in college football or the NFL.21 8
Now, the BCA has partnered with Spector Gadon & Rosen, a Phila-
delphia-based law firm, to create an employment rights hotline for
coaches who believe to be victims of discrimination. 2 19 Hopefully,
with the resources and support that the BCA offers potential plain-
tiff coaches, one will soon come forward, willing to take a stand.220
G. The Coin Flip: The Potential for a Reverse
Discrimination Claim
1. Reverse Discriminations Against Private Universities
Title VII protections are not just limited to minorities; whites
may bring claims as well. 2 21 Therefore, a program that the NCAA
or one of its member institutions implements to promote the hiring
of minority head coaches might backfire and subject the NCAA or
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.
Id.
218. SeeJackson v. University of New Haven, 228 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Conn.
2002) (noting disposition of case occurred in October 2002, just before Cochran
and Mehri handed their report to NFL).
219. BCA Member Employment Rights Hotline, http://bcasports.cstv.com/
genrel/ 122208aag.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2009). On its website, the BCA
explains:
It has been well publicized lately that minority coaches and other minor-
ity athletic program employees are consistently faced with difficult legal
issues relating to all aspects of their employment, including discrimina-
tory failures to hire and promote, equal job assignment and compensa-
tion, and contract problems. In response to these important employment
issues and as an important membership benefit, the BCA has established
the BCA MEMBER EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS HOTLINE to permit our
members to call a nationwide, toll-free telephone number and confiden-
tially discuss their individual employment concerns with a qualified
sports/employment attorney at no initial cost to the member.
Id.
220. See id. (announcing BCA's willingness to assist potential plaintiff pro
bono).
221. See Collins, supra note 2, at 890 (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295-96 (1976)) (explaining history of reverse discrimination
suits). Shropshire explains that reverse discrimination claims stem from the com-
peting tensions in Title VII. See Shropshire, supra note 2, at 464 (discussing how
any affirmative action can create potential for reverse discrimination claims). Af-
firmative action plans that require race to be taken into account on their face seem
to be violations of the law. See id. at 463-64 (assessing legality of affirmative action
plans). Many of these programs, however, are meant to reduce the effects of past
discrimination and thus the consideration of race is "benign and legal." Id. at 464.
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institutions to liability for reverse discrimination. 222 Moreover, if
colleges and universities comply with the guidelines set forth by the
Division IA Athletic Directors' Association, a white coach may sue
for injury suffered pursuant to those guidelines. 223 Some commen-
tators, however, believe that the Rooney Rule will be found valid
under a reverse discrimination claim. 224
In a reverse discrimination claim, the threshold issue will be:
whether the Robinson Rule amounts to affirmative action.225 Pro-
ponents of the rule deny that it is affirmative action, probably be-
cause they are afraid it will then be subject to judicial examination
for reverse discrimination. 226 Brian Collins believes, however, that
222. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 17 (exploring potential for liability in case of
reverse discrimination); Cummings, supra note 3, at 37 (discussing possibility of
reverse discrimination suit).
223. For a further discussion of NCAA coaching guidelines, see supra notes
97-106 and accompanying text.
224. See Collins, supra note 2, at 872 (describing Rooney Rule as "legally via-
ble"); Cummings, supra note 3, at 37 (asserting that reverse discrimination suit will
likely fail).
225. See Collins, supra note 2, at 888 (analyzing reverse discrimination suit in
context of NFL's Rooney Rule). The Robinson Rule at this point would be volun-
tary affirmative action. See id. Affirmative action, however, can be voluntarily im-
plemented by employers or can be a response to legal action. See Shropshire, supra
note 2, at 460 (reviewing affirmative action generally in Corporate America). A
claim challenging an affirmative action plan would be for systemic disparate treat-
ment, but white plaintiffs may also bring individual disparate treatment claims, as
well as disparate impact claims. See id.
226. See Collins, supra note 2, at 888 (explaining that proponents also avoid
calling rule affirmative action because of reaction it evokes in majority). Cyrus
Mehri said: "I don't view the [Rooney] rule as affirmative action because it focuses
on process, best practices, fair competition, leveling the playing field, and letting
the best rise to the top, [not quotas]." Maravent, supra note 33, at 263 (quoting
Telephone Interview with Cyrus Mehri, Partner at Mehri & Skalet, PLLC (Nov. 18,
2005)). Moreover, John Wooten of the Fritz Pollard Alliance said:
[I]t was never intended to be affirmative action. Pure affirmative action is
firm timetables and quotas, but that is not the way to go because it is not
effective. The inclusive process is the right way to thread the needle. Cor-
porations are requiring a diversity slate. [We are] not trying to get quotas
based on player ratios in the NFL. All we are saying is that we believe in
the interview process-just let them (minority candidates) in the door to
show their skills in an open process and they will have a great chance to
get a [head coaching] job.
Id. (citing Telephone Interview with John Wooten, Chairman of the Fritz Pollard
Alliance (Nov. 17, 2005)). Finally, Dr. Lapchick said: "It is pretty close but [the
Rooney rule] is limited in its application. But it is for a purpose, although that
purpose is to bring in the best person for the job. This is not results oriented, it is
for one position only, and it is not across the board." Id. (citing Telephone Inter-
view with Dr. Richard Lapchick, Dir. of the Inst. For Diversity & Ethics in Sport at
the Univ. of Cent. Fla. (Dec. 17, 2005)).
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the rule is "undoubtedly" affirmative action because it is "a diversity
initiative aimed at correcting racial disparities. '" 227
In United Steelworkers v. Weber, the Supreme Court developed
the test for the validity of affirmative action programs. 228 In Weber,
the Court held that "Tide VII cannot be interpreted as an absolute
prohibition against 'all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative
action plans."229 The Court declined to 'define . . . the line of
demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative ac-
227. Collins, supra note 2, at 888 (considering what type of affirmative action
it might be). Madden asserts that the rule is structured how affirmative action was
originally conceived, before quotas and timelines. See Madden Interview, supra
note 72 (discussing whether Rooney Rule can be considered affirmative action).
Shropshire notes,
[A]t least four types of affirmative action are recognized: the concerted
effort to recruit member of the underrepresented group; the utilization
of programs such as diversity and sensitivity training; the modification of
employment practices which tend to underutilize underrepresented indi-
viduals; and . . . the preferential hiring and promotion of members of
underrepresented groups.
Shropshire, supra note 2, at 464-65. Maravent defines affirmative action as 'a busi-
ness or governmental agency... giv[ing] special rights of hiring or advancement
to ethnic minorities to make up for past discrimination against that minority.'
Maravent, supra note 33, at 262 (citing BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 64 (8th ed.
2004)). Maravent argues that "[t]he Rooney Rule can be classified as affirmative
action because its purpose is to afford minorities a greater opportunity in being
awarded head coaching positions." Id. "[T]he rule is an example of a business
(the NFL) giving special rights (mandating one minority interview per team with a
coaching vacancy) to ethnic minorities (as the interviews arguably do) to correct
past discrimination (the alleged lack of minority hires in the NFL's head coaching
ranks)." Id. at 262-63 (matching rule's provisions to definition of affirmative ac-
tion). Collins argues that the Rooney Rule has characteristics of both hard and
soft affirmative action. See Collins, supra note 2, at 889 ("'[S] oft' affirmative action
programs encompass outreach attempts like minority recruitment and counseling,
'hard' affirmative action programs usually include explicit preferences or quotas
that reserve a specific number of openings exclusively for members of the pre-
ferred group."). The Rooney Rule is hard affirmative action because it forces NFL
teams to "reserve" one interview during each search for a minority. Id. (expressing
reasons for rule being "hard"). It is soft affirmative action because it includes
minority recruitment efforts. See id. (detailing basis for Rooney Rule being consid-
ered "soft" affirmative action).
228. See Collins, supra note 2, at 890-91 (describing reverse discrimination law
as judicially created). Weber involved a challenge to an affirmative action plan that
reserved fifty percent of openings in a training program for blacks. See id. at 891
(summarizing facts of Weber case). The plan was to remain in effect until the
representation of black workers in the plant was equal to that in the local labor
force. See id. . Weber was rejected from the program in favor of black employees
that had less seniority. See id. (expressing reasoning behind bringing suit). He
sued and prevailed in the lower courts. See id.
229. See id. (quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979)).
The Court reasoned that Title VII must be read in light of its legislative history and
historical context. See id. (citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200-
02 (1979)).
2010]
45
Hochbaum: And It Only Took Them 307 Years: Ruminations on Legal and Non-Leg
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
206 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL [
tion plans,' but it did provide a test for evaluating their validity.230
The Weber test includes three factors: (1) the plan must seek to cor-
rect a manifest imbalance in the employer's workforce by opening
employment opportunities to minorities in areas traditionally
closed to them; (2) the plan must not "unnecessarily trammel the
interests of white employees"; and (3) the plan must be a temporary
measure, designed to obtain, rather than maintain, a racial
balance. 2 31
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, the Court expanded upon
the "manifest imbalance" prong of the Weber test.23 2 To find a man-
ifest imbalance, a court must first evaluate whether the position at
issue is unskilled or skilled. 233 If the affirmative action plan applies
to unskilled jobs, the court must compare minority representation
in the employer's workplace to minority representation in the area
labor market or general population.234 If the affirmative action
program applies to skilled positions, the court must compare the
percentage of minorities in the employer's workforce to the num-
ber of qualified persons in the area labor market. 235
If a white coach brings a reverse discrimination claim against a
school that followed the Robinson Rule, he first must establish his
prima facie case under McDonnell Douglass.236 The employer will
then posit that it instituted a voluntary affirmative action policy - a
form of justifiable discrimination.2 3 7 Next, the white coach must
demonstrate one of the following: (1) that the Robinson Rule is not
designed to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance, (2) that it unnec-
230. Id. (quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979)).
231. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09 (outlining test).
232. See Collins, supra note 2, at 892 (explaining Court's establishment of cur-
rent reverse discrimination standard). In Johnson, the Court upheld a voluntary
affirmative action plan implemented by a country government. See id. "According
to the Court, the Agency's plan correctly calculated imbalances and directed hir-
ing to be governed solely by those figures, did not displace current Caucasian em-
ployees or establish a bar to their advancement, and was sufficiently temporary in
its efforts to attain a balanced workforce (rather than maintain one)."
Id. (citing Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, at
631, 634-35, 637-40 (1987)).
233. See id. (stressing need to determine appropriate comparison group).
234. See id. (quoting Johnson, 480 U.S. 631-32).
235. See id. at 892-93 (citing Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632) (describing reliance on
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States).
236. See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
237. See Collins, supra note 2, at 894 (citing Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626 (1987))
(explaining process whereby employer rebuts coach's claim using the rationale of
affirmative action).
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essarily trammels the interests of white candidates, or (3) that it is
not a temporary measure.238
Under the manifest imbalance prong, Collins believes a court
will consider head coaching to be a traditionally segregated job cat-
egory. 239 As stated previously, however, the parties would dispute
what constitutes an appropriate comparison group in the labor
market.240 Collins believes that head coaching will definitely be
considered a skilled position; consequently, the parties would fight
over how many coaches to consider qualified, and thus, whether
the resulting labor market disparity rises to a level considered to be
a manifest imbalance.241
Regarding the unnecessarily trammel prong, Collins thinks
that a court will find that the Robinson Rule or the Athletic Direc-
tors' Association guidelines do not unnecessarily trammel the inter-
ests of whites because they are not an absolute bar to the
advancement of white coaches. 242 Because the rule and guidelines
only mandate or request interviewing and consideration, and not
hiring, they do not include quotas and, instead, ensure that who-
ever is hired is qualified. 243 Therefore, although reserving an inter-
238. See id. (citing Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631-32).
239. See id. (tracing historical segregation of NFL coaching).
240. See id. at 895-97 (identifying who to include in relevant labor market).
241. See id. at 895 (predicting that struggle will ensue over relevant compari-
son in reverse discrimination claim as well). Collins contends that an employer
would argue that not all coaches are qualified to be head coaches and would most
likely contend that the labor market be limited to offensive and defensive coor-
dinators and not include assistant coaches. See id. at 896-97 (speculating that this
would result in smaller minority representation in comparative labor market).
Collins further posits that the parties would dispute what constituted manifest im-
balance. See id. at 895-96 (citing Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632). In Johnson, the Court
held that the disparity need not rise to the level needed to establish a prima facie
case under Title VII - two or three standard deviations. See id. at 895-96 (citing
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632).
242. See id. at 899 (noting that rule does not mandate replacement of white
coaches).
243. See id. at 898 ("Since he gains no entitlement to the head coaching posi-
tion, a [Robinson] Rule beneficiary must still compete with all other qualified ap-
plicants, none of who are automatically excluded from consideration."); see also
Cummings, supra note 3, at 37 (distinguishing between what Rooney Rule does
and does not require); Maravent, supra note 33, at 264 (stating that rule only adds
candidate to pool and does not require that minority be hired). Moreover, Collins
explains that quotas "are not per se illegal." Collins, supra note 2, at 898. Rather, a
quota will only be found invalid if there is not a legitimate basis for the figure set
by the policy, like when it is based on "speculative or amorphous data [and] is
arbitrarily fixed." Id.
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view for a minority may be considered a significant advantage, it
does not unnecessarily trammel the rights of white candidates. 244
Finally, Collins proposes that the temporary measure prong is
the factor that comes closest to rendering the Robinson Rule or
Athletic Directors' Association guidelines invalid.2 45 If the Robin-
son Rule, when adopted, is identical to the Rooney Rule, it would
contain no time limitation. 246 In Johnson, the Court upheld a plan
with no end date, and found that an end date is only necessary
when there are explicit quotas and that the plan at issue sought to
attain, and not maintain, balanced representation,. 247 Therefore,
Collins contends that the Robinson Rule and guidelines, which do
not include quotas or timetables, are still temporary because of the
"moderate, gradual approach [they take] to eliminating the racial
imbalance."248
2. Reverse Discrimination Against Public Universities
Public entities are subject to liability under Title VII and in
Johnson, the plaintiff sued such an entity.2 49 Public entities' affirma-
tive action programs, however, are also subject to constitutional re-
view under the Equal Protection Clause.2 50  Therefore, public
universities who employ the Robinson Rule or Athletic Directors'
Association guidelines may be sued for violating a white coach's
equal protection rights.251
244. See Collins, supra note 2, at 897-99 (explaining it is significant because
team cannot interview unlimited number of candidates). Maravent explains that
"[a]s long as the interview process remains fundamentally fair to all candidates,
minority and majority, there is no trammeling of interests." Maravent, supra note
33, at 264.
245. See Collins, supra note 2, at 899 (classifying rule as "flirt[ing] with imper-
missibility"); see also Maravent, supra note 33, at 264 (describing factor as rule's
"weakest").
246. See Collins, supra note 2, at 899 (noting that rule has no end date);
Maravent, supra note 33, at 264 (mentioning that rule does not specify how long it
should be enforced).
247. See Collins, supra note 2, at 899 (citingJohnson, 480 U.S. at 639-40) (refer-
encing holding ofJohnson whereby lack of termination date does not render Rule
void).
248. Id. at 899-900 (contending that Rooney Rule will be found valid under
Title VII reverse discrimination analysis).
249. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 18 (noting that schools are also subject to
liability as federally assisted programs).
250. See Maravent, supra note 33, at 252 (describing tests for public and pri-
vate employers).
251. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 18 (relying upon Fourteenth Amendment
Right of Equal Protection). A plaintiff may argue that a private university is violat-
ing Title VI, but that is outside the scope of this article. See id.
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The Supreme Court held, in National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion v. Tarkanian, that the NCAA was not a state actor.252 Public
universities, however, the Court determined were state actors.25 3 As
a result, in Tarkanian, the University of Nevada Las Vegas was found
liable for depriving its basketball coach of procedural and substan-
tive due process rights. 2 5 4 Consequently, when public universities
implement NCAA regulations, they must still comply with constitu-
tional requirements. 25 5 A public university would have to defend a
challenge to the Robinson Rule or the Athletic Directors' Associa-
tion guidelines under Equal Protection analysis, despite the fact
that the NCAA would monitor, or the Athletic Directors' Associa-
tion does monitor compliance. 256
252. 488 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1988). The Court described the NCAA as "an un-
incorporated association of approximately 960 members, including virtually all
public and private universities and 4-year colleges conducting major athletic pro-
grams in the United States. Basic policies of the NCAA are determined by the
members at annual conventions." Id. at 183 (characterizing defendant as private
entity). Moreover, the NCAA,
Has . . . adopted rules, which it calls "legislation," ... governing the con-
duct of the intercollegiate athletic programs of its members. This NCAA
legislation applies to a variety of issues, such as academic standards for
eligibility, admissions, financial aid, and the recruiting of student ath-
letes. By joining the NCAA, each member agrees to abide by and to en-
force such rules.
Id. (explaining that there was not sufficient nexus between NCAA and UNLV).
Tarkanian, was a 5-4 decision, and Justices White, Brennan, Marshall and
O'Connor dissented. See id. at 199 (White, B., dissenting). The dissent wrote that
the Court had previously held that private parties could be state actors in situations
where the final act was conducted by a state official, as long as the private party and
state actor where jointly engaged. See id. at 200 (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S.
24, 27-28 (1980)). Moreover, in Cohane v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, the Sec-
ond Circuit held that Tarkanian cannot be interpreted to categorically stand for
the proposition that the NCAA can never be found to be a state actor. See Cohane
v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 215 Fed. Appx. 13, 16 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[I]t was
error for the District Court to interpret Tarkanian as holding categorically that the
NCAA can never be a state actor when it conducts an investigation of a state
school.").
253. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192 (stating that UNLV is undoubtedly state
actor). In describing UNLV's role, the Court said: "UNLV is a branch of the Uni-
versity of Nevada, a state-funded institution. The university is organized and oper-
ated pursuant to provisions of Nevada's State Constitution, statutes, and
regulations. In performing their official functions, the executives of UNLV un-
questionably act under color of state law." Id. at 183.
254. See id. at 187-88, 192-93 ("When [UNLV] decides to impose a serious
disciplinary sanction upon one of its tenured employees, it must comply with the
terms of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution.").
255. See id. at 192-93 (finding UNLV is still subject to Section 1983 liability).
256. See Maravent, supra note 33, at 252 (describing how public actors are
held to Equal Protection Clause when implementing affirmative action policies).
20101
49
Hochbaum: And It Only Took Them 307 Years: Ruminations on Legal and Non-Leg
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
210 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause pro-
hibits states from denying to any person equal protection of the
law.25 7 According to the Supreme Court, race-based classifications
are suspect and, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny under equal
protection analysis. 258 Under a strict scrutiny standard, the govern-
ment must demonstrate that the racial classification was necessary
to achieve a compelling state interest.259 The government must
also demonstrate that the means chosen were narrowly tailored. 260
The Robinson Rule and the Athletic Directors' Association
guidelines include race-based classifications. 261 Consequently, a
court would apply strict scrutiny to determine whether the school
violated the white coach's right to equal protection. 262 The public
university might posit two compelling interests: (1) that the univer-
sity has an interest in ending discrimination in public employment;
and (2) that the university has an interest in creating a more con-
structive educational atmosphere for its students by providing them
with positive role-models.2 63 A court, however, may not accept
257. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
258. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 216 (1995) (hold-
ing that race-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny).
259. See id. at 202 (clarifying that strict scrutiny requires government to
demonstrate compelling interest); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 300 (1978) (requiring government to show compelling state interest).
260. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 ("[S]uch [racially based] classifications are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests.").
261. For a further discussion about the Robinson Rule, see supra notes 59-70
and accompanying text. For a further discussion about the Athletic Directors' As-
sociation guidelines, see supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
262. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 216 (holding that race-based classifications are
subject to strict scrutiny); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) ("[The
Court has] held that all racial classifications imposed by government 'must be ana-
lyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.' This means that such classifica-
tions are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further
compelling governmental interests.").
263. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 352 (Thomas, C., dissenting) (citing Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267 315 (1986) ("The school board defended [collec-
tive bargaining agreement that favors minorities] on the grounds that minority
teachers provided "role models" for minority students and that a racially "diverse"
faculty would improve the education of all students.); Id. at 367 ("The state shall
not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation
of public employment, public education, or public contracting" (quoting Cal.
Const., Art. 1, § 31(a)); see also Gratz ,v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 257 (2003) ("Re-
spondents contended that the LSA has [a compelling government interest] in the
educational benefits that result from having a racially and ethnically diverse stu-
dent body and that its program is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."), do not
italicize case (Grutter) RI.2; correction of case citation
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these rationales. 264 If the court finds that the state does not have a
history of discriminating against minority coaches, it may reject the
first interest asserted by the state. 265 Moreover, if the court finds
that the Robinson Rule or the Athletic Directors' Association guide-
lines are over-inclusive and are not specifically directed at a group
that the state has historically discriminated against in coaching,
then it may also dismiss the first compelling interest. 266
The court may also reject the second compelling interest. It
was specifically rejected by the plurality in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education.267 There, the plurality found that the school board's in-
terest in "providing minority role models for its minority students,
as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination" was
not a compelling interest and did not justify the race-based
classification. 268
Even if the court accepts the public university's compelling in-
terest rationales, the university must still show that the Robinson
Rule or the Athletic Directors' Association guidelines are narrowly
tailored. 269 Here, the university would argue that the Rule ensures
that minorities are hired in positions from which they were histori-
264. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271 (holding University of Michigan's policy that
automatically grants "underrepresented minority" candidates one-fifth of points
needed to guarantee admission solely because of race to not be "narrowly tailored"
to advance an interest in educational diversity). See R1.2
265. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 221 (rejecting state interest in ending public
employment discrimination and ruling state interest not compelling if no histori-
cal evidence of discrimination exists).
266. See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) ("The gross
overinclusiveness of Richmond's racial preference strongly impugns the city's
claim of remedial motivation." (citing Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Edu., 476 U.S. 267,
284, n.13 (1986))).
267. Wygant, 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (insinuating "role model" theory would al-
low Boards to engage in discriminatory hiring and layoff practices far beyond what
is required by any legitimate remedial purpose).
268. Id. at 274. Justice White, concurring in judgment, agreed that the school
board's interest did not justify the racially discriminatory policy. See id. at 295
("None of the interests asserted by the Board, singly or together, justify this racially
discriminatory layoff policy and save it from the strictures of the Equal Protection
Clause.").
269. See JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 506 ("The random inclusion of racial
groups that, as a practical matter, may never have suffered from discrimination in
the construction industry in Richmond suggests that perhaps the city's purpose
was not in fact to remedy past discrimination."); Grutter, v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
333 (2003) (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996) ("Even in the limited
circumstance when drawing racial distinctions is permissible to further a compel-
ling state interest, government is still "constrained in how it may pursue that end:
[T]he means chosen to accomplish the [government's] asserted purpose must be
specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.").
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cally excluded. 270 They would argue that the rule is not restrictive
and that it simply calls for the addition of a minority to the list of
candidates interviewed. 271 The white coach, however, would argue
that the minority was not added to the list of those interviewed, but
rather replaced the white coach on the list of candidates to be inter-
viewed.272 The white coach would also assert that there are other
types of affirmative action programs to ensure that minority candi-
dates are hired, such as training programs for minority coaches and
diversity training for those hiring. 273 The university would respond
that those programs are not effective in remedying the problem im-
mediately and that their effect will only occur in the long-term. 274
Finally, the university may demonstrate the effectiveness of the
Robinson Rule by using evidence from the NFL's experience with
the Rooney Rule. 275
It is unclear how a court might rule on an equal protection
claim questioning the validity of the Robinson Rule or Athletic Di-
rectors' Association guidelines. Nevertheless, there is a plethora of
case law where plaintiffs alleged that public universities who com-
plied with NCAA regulations were violating the plaintiffs' constitu-
tional rights. 2 7 6 Therefore, any adoption of the Robinson Rule
must be carefully crafted to comply with the constitutional require-
ments of public universities.
270. See Collins, supra note 2, at 894 (proposing that employers need only to
articulate some nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision, with affirmative action
rationale sufficing).
271. See Cummings, supra note 3, at 131 ("[T]he Rooney Rule does not man-
date any hiring action on the part of the owners of the privately owned NFL clubs.
The Rooney Rule does not even assign a "plus factor" to the minority candidates
that are interviewed by the NFL clubs."); Maravent, supra note 33, at 264 (revealing
effect on white coaches).
272. See Maravent, supra note 33, at 264 (indicating opposite that white candi-
dates are not barred from receiving opportunity to interview).
273. See Shropshire, supra note 2, at 464-65 (suggesting alternative types of
affirmative action).
274. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 161.
275. See Collins, supra note 2, at 121; Nichols, supra note 6, at 157 ("The
Rooney Rule is widely credited as being the catalyst for the rapid increase in mi-
nority head coaches [in the NFL].").
276. See generally Maloney v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 897 N.E.2d 253
(Ill. 2008); Cohane v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 2008 WL 3286396 (W.D.N.Y.
2008); Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 563 F. Supp. 2d 508 (D.N.J. 2008);
Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008); Cottrell v.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 128 S. Ct. 1334 (2008); Harrick v. Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
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H. Whether the NCAA Can Be Held Responsible
Although the NCAA is partly responsible for the diversity prob-
lem in college football coaching, it is unlikely that a plaintiff will
name the NCAA in a Title VII discrimination lawsuit. 277 Some be-
lieve that the NCAA, in its role as regulator of college athletics, can
be sued for fostering a system where its member institutions' hiring
practices have a disparate impact on blacks.278 But the NCAA is not
actually an employer and is not involved in the colleges' and univer-
sities' actual hiring decisions. 279 Moreover, the NCAA will not be
found liable in a case involving a constitutional issue, be it an equal
protection claim or a § 1983 action, because it is not a state actor.28 0
Therefore, the NCAA most likely will not be found liable for a prob-
lem it is responsible for perpetuating which may be why its response
to threats of legal action, thus far, have been limited.28 '
V. THE NCAA's EvAswE RESPONSE
A. The NCAA's Diversity Initiatives
After the lack of diversity in head coaching positions received
increased attention, the NCAA implemented new initiatives to in-
crease the number of minority coaches.2 82 In 2005, the NCAA cre-
ated the Office of Diversity and Inclusion (the ODI). 283 Brand
hired Charlotte Westerhaus to be Vice President of the office and
gave her the responsibility of helping schools and the NCAA diver-
sify their workforces. 28 4 As a result, the number of blacks employed
277. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 9 (describing NCAA's role and
responsibility).
278. See Louis, supra note 10, at 189 (hoping court will find close tie between
NCAA and employer so NCAA can be held responsible).
279. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 9 (observing difficulty in holding NCAA
responsible for hiring decisions); Louis, supra note 10, at 192-96 (describing
NCAA's actual role).
280. For a further discussion of the NCAA's status as a non-state actor, see
supra notes 254-257 and accompanying text.
281. For a further discussion of the NCAA's apparent lack of concern regard-
ing legal action, see infra notes 297-307 and accompanying text.
282. See Ford, supra note 6 at 109 n.174 (citing to Press Release, NCAA, NCAA
Selects 12 Participants for Expert Coaching Program to be Held in Indianapolis,
June 1-3 (May 21, 2004), available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentlD=
8051); see also Maravent & Tario, supra note 33, at 48 (describing NCAA
initiatives).
283. See Racial and Gender Report Card, supra note 8, at 4 (describing NCAA
diversity program); Nichols, supra 6, at 155 (mentioning creation of office); Ford,
supra note 6, at 110 (noting creation of office).
284. See Ford, supra note 6, at 110 (describing Westerhaus's responsibilities);
Gordon, supra note 18, at 13 (discussing Westerhaus's hiring).
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as NCAA administrators increased from forty-six to sixty-four.285
The ODI offers to host diversity training programs at individual col-
leges and universities.286 It aims to help schools understand the
diversity problem and provides approaches to alleviate the problem
by publishing reports such as "Best Practices: Achieving Excellence
Through Diversity and Inclusion," "Best Hiring Practices," and
"Race and Gender Demographics of NCAA Member Institutions'
Athletics Personnel."287 Finally, the NCAA offers scholarships,
grants, and awards to promote and reward diversity. 288
The ODI is attempting to address the pipeline problem, which
it believes to be the cause of the dearth of minority head
coaches. 289 Its approach is to train coaches with the expectation
that they will one day be considered candidates for head coaching
positions. 290 The NCAA partnered with the NFL, BCA and Ameri-
can Football Coaches Association to create the Coaches' Acad-
285. See Diversity Hearing, supra note 12 (noting diversity initiatives).
286. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 155 (taking notice that training is offered at
member institutions); Gordon, supra note 18, at 13 (establishing that training is
offered at no cost).
287. Nichols, supra note 6, at 155 (listing reports Office of Diversity and Inclu-
sion publishes). The NCAA, however, has not released some of these reports in
recent years. See Lapchick, Racial and Gender Report Card, supra note 8, at 4.
288. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 155 (giving overview of NCAA scholarships to
award and promote diversity); Gordon, supra note 18, at 13 (mentioning grants
given to Division II and III schools and for coaching internships for minorities and
women, as well as "Woman of the Year" awards).
289. See Ford, supra note 6, at 97 (discussing efforts to address pipeline prob-
lem); Gordon, supra note 18, at 13 (illustrating efforts of Office of Diversity and
Inclusiveness); Nichols, supra note 6, at 155 (noting additional efforts made to
address lack of minority coaches in college football).
290. See Ford, supra note 6, at 110 (portraying mission of Office of Diversity
and Inclusion); Gordon, supra note 18, at 13 (discussing men's and women's acad-
emies); Nichols, supra note 6, at 155 (summarizing training at Coaches Academy).
Actually, "Kansas State University's Ron Prince, Columbia University's Norries Wil-
son, and St. Peters College's Chris Taylor" are Academy graduates. Diversity Hear-
ing, supra note 12 (reporting impact of Coaches Academy). In his State of the
Association address in 2007, Brand said:
[T]he NCAA can help prepare candidate for the search process. The
NCAA conducts nineteen programs annually to provide practical and
professional education and advice to candidates. These programs range
from academies for relative beginners to advanced levels, and include op-
portunities for both men and women. Hundreds of individuals have
gone through these programs during the last five years.
Brand Address, supra note 4 (providing framework of Coaches Academy program).
The NCAA holds other training opportunities for groups that are similarly under-
represented in coaching positions, such as women. See Nichols, supra note 6, at
155 (describing training for traditionally underrepresented minorities, including
women).
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emy. 29 1 'The Coaches Academy is an NCAA initiative created to
address the critical shortage of ethnic minorities in head coaching
positions in the sport of football.' 29 2 There are three levels to the
Coaches Academy program: Expert, Advanced, and Executive.29 3
Another program, the Future Coaches Academy, works to train for-
mer players who aspire to become college coaches. 294
B. Criticism Levied Against the NCAA's Diversity Initiatives
The NCAA's diversity initiatives are criticized for not going far
enough. 29 5 Dr. Madden concluded in her report to the NFL that
the "pipeline" excuse is overstated. 29 6 She demonstrated that black
coaches were performing at a higher level than white coaches and,
thus, were being held to a higher standard.29 7 If the same double
291. See Ford, supra note 6, at 109 (describing effort to create training sessions
for coaches).
292. Id. (explaining that academy seeks to address shortage of qualified mi-
nority candidates (quoting NCAA Selects 12 Participants for Expert Coaching Program to
be held in Indianapolis, June 1-3 (May 21, 2004), available at http://www.ncaa.org/
wps/ncaa?key=/ncaa/NCAA/Media+and+Events/Press+Room/News+Release+
Archive/2004/Miscellaneous/NCAA+Selects+1 2+Participants+for+Expert+Coach-
ing+Program+to+be+Held+in+lndianapolis,+June+1-3
293. See id. at 109-10 (conveying different types of training offered).
The expert Coaching Program was created for minority football coaches
with at least six years of coaching experience and has the goal of teaching
and reinforcing "various aspects of securing, managing and excelling in
NCAA head coaching positions at the Division I-A level; and to provide
participants with an experience that emphasizes the importance of skill
enhancement, networking and exposure to key stakeholders in intercolle-
giate athletics." The Advance Coaching Program is for football coaches
with at least four years of experience, and the Executive Coaching Pro-
gram is for football coaches with at least eight years of experience.
Id. (defending efforts to help coaches from all types of backgrounds and
experiences).
294. See id. at 109 (discussing part of program that aims to recruit young for-
mer players). The objectives of the Coaches' Academy are:
(1) [t]o increase the understanding and application of skills necessary to
secure head coaching positions; (2) to increase the understanding and
awareness of competencies necessary for success in head coaching at the
intercollegiate level; (3) to motivate assistant coaches and coordinator to
pursue careers as head coaches at the Division I-A level; (4) to introduce
ethnic minority and women coaches to senior level coaches and adminis-
trators through a mentoring program; (5) to raise public awareness of
the existing talent pool of ethnic minority and women coaches; and (6)
to promote the coaching profession to student-athletes, graduate assist-
ants and others[.]
Id. (listing Coaches Academy objectives). [No Star Pagination]
295. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 161 (outlining initiatives' inadequacies).
296. Madden Report, supra note 42, at 16-18 (debunking NFL's pipeline
excuse).
297. See id. at 6 (introducing findings). It is unclear whether black coaches in
college football are outperforming white coaches because the data has not been
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standard exists in college coaching, then the NCAA's efforts are
misplaced.
Michael Nichols criticizes the emphasis placed upon training
minority coaches on two fronts. 298 First, Nichols says, "it seems to
ignore that many minority coaches are already qualified and are
merely not being given head coaching opportunities. '299 Second,
Nichols explains, it relies on 'soft variants' to invoke change. 300
Soft variants are less effective and take longer to yield results, yet
are used because the majority finds them less offensive.30' Nichols
concludes that "[b]y using soft variants, the NCAA can give the ap-
pearance of action."30 2
Hanna Gordon agrees that efforts such as the Office of Diver-
sity and Inclusion are merely symbolic. 30 3 She discusses a theory
that institutions will set up formal structures like a diversity commit-
tee in response to equal employment opportunity law but then allo-
cate insufficient resources to these committees.3 0 4 These
analyzed. But it is worth mentioning that the NCAA is relying on an excuse that
Madden disproved in the NFL context.
298. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 161-62 (discussing inadequacies of current
minority coach training).
299. Id. "The concept of hard versus soft variants regards the difference in
method used to achieve a result rooted in affirmative action. 'While "soft" affirma-
tive action programs encompass outreach attempts like minority recruitment and
counseling, "hard" affirmative action programs usually include explicit preferences
or quotas that reserve a specific number of openings exclusively for members of
the preferred group."' Id. at 161 n.65 (quoting Collins, supra note 2, at 889).
Gordon also argues that focusing on training ignores the fact that the coaches are
in fact already qualified and are simply not being hired. See Gordon, supra note 18,
at 13 ("First, the emphasis on preparation suggests that candidates are not already
qualified and possess the "soft skills" required for interviewing."). She cites to re-
search that studies the common perception among employers that minorities lack
skills in areas such as communication, interaction and motivation. See id. at 13
n.59 (citing Karen Chapple & Michael B Teitz, The Causes of inner-City poverty: Eight
Hypotheses in Search of Reality, CITYSCAPE: AJ. OF POL'v DEV. & RES., (Sept. 1998), at
33, 35).
300. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 161 (explaining differences in effectiveness
of varying types of affirmative action).
301. See id. (describing slow nature of soft affirmative action).
302. See id. (affirming that NCAA is avoiding addressing problem). Gordon
similarly criticizes the NCAA programs because nothing has changed; despite the
coaching academes, minorities remain underrepresented in head coaching posi-
tions. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 14 (discussing hiring statistics).
303. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 14 (explaining NCAA implemented initia-
tives that cannot invoke change).
304. See id. (citing Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Manageri-
alization of Law, 106 Am. J. Soc. 1589 (2001)).
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committees, subsequently, are simply highly visible signs of compli-
ance designed to assuage equality advocates.30 5
VI. BETTER WAYS TO AVOID LITIGATION, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY,
DvERsiFY COACHING
A. Attack the Hiring Process as a Whole
Dutch Baughman concedes "we must do a better job of the
identification and interviewing procedure before we begin to see
significant improvements in the number of head coaches."30 6 In
that vein, Jacquelyn Bridgeman asserts that despite the progress
that has been made by laws, like Title VII, to diversify all levels of
the workforce, the current law fails to address the problem in its
entirety.30 7 Consequently, Bridgeman argues that we should look
to sports, specifically the differing selection procedures for players
and coaches, for guidance on addressing the diversity problem in
upper-management.3 0 8
When a coach chooses a player for a team, the coach may
watch the player in game situations to evaluate his skill level.3 0 9
Other times, the coach will analyze his player statistics to predict
future performance. 310 Alternatively, a coach may directly asses a
player's skills to ensure that he will be competitive. 311 Lastly, a
305. See id. (summarizing how diversity committees redefine compliance with
equal opportunity laws).
306. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 154 (quoting Interview with Dutch Baugh-
man, Executive Director of the Division 1A Athletic Directors' Association (May 27,
2008)).
307. See Bridgeman, supra note 10, at 259-60 (accounting for inadequacies of
Title VII). Bridgeman explains,
While this progress is significant and should not be discounted, it is much
less remarkable when one considers that many opportunities in high posi-
tions are still largely foreclosed to women and minorities, much like the
situation in sports. For example, while the percentages of black attorneys
has risen from less than 1% to approximately 3.9% of all U.S. attorneys in
the last forty years, black comprise 12.9% of the population. When these
facts are taken into consideration, the progress does not look as signifi-
cant. Many economic sectors demonstrate similar low numbers of wo-
men and minorities in higher-level jobs. This disparity is clearly
illustrated when one compares higher paying, more prestigious jobs to
those that pay less and carry less prestige. For example, the data from the
2000 census reveals ... [t] he top professions were overwhelmingly white
and male.
Id. at 260-61 (exposing areas of workforce that Title VII cannot reach).
308. See id. at 261-62 (encouraging advocates to examine hiring processes in
sports to understand other industries).
309. See id. at 262 (describing how players get hired or recruited).
310. See id. (outlining methods for proving value to coaches).
311. See id. (describing methods coach can evaluate player's worth).
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coach may require a player to tryout for a team position, forcing
competition for a spot against another player. 312
The hiring process for coaches, however, is more subjective
and is more akin to the hiring processes in other job sectors. 313
When coaches are hired, schools sometimes solicit resumes from
interested candidates or compile a list of candidates "through word
of mouth or upon consultation with friends or family."314 From the
pool of candidates, a school will then decide who to interview and
based upon the interview, who to hire.315 Criteria during interview-
ing can include subjective factors such as good recruiting ability,
management expertise and public relations skills.31 6 This becomes
problematic because subjective hiring processes are highly suscepti-
ble to unconscious bias. 317 It is possible, however, to suppress the
effects of, and sometimes completely overcome, unconscious
bias. 318
312. See id. (making clear that player selection is extremely objective)
313. See id. at 262-63 (maintaining that hiring process for coaches is more
similar to other types of jobs).
314. Id. at 262-63 (noting social networks' role).
315. See id. at 263 (commenting on narrowing selection). Bridgeman ex-
plains that a coach would never select players for a team based on whether their
resume indicated they had a good background or whether they were well liked by
their teammates. See id. Players, unlike coaches, are almost always required to
demonstrate that they can perform or acquire the ability to perform, and interact
well with the team. See id.
316. See Maravent and Tario, supra note 33, at 47 (exploring objective and
subjective factors in hiring head coaches). Duru describes the skills schools say
they look for as 'good at recruiting, good in the living room [with potential re-
cruits and their families], that they can galvanize people.' Id. at 48 (quoting Tele-
phone Interview with Jeremi Duru (Mar. 20, 2007)). Maravent and Tario explain
that search committees often talk about finding a "good fit." Id. at 47 (analyzing
hiring criteria). By saying that the hired coach was a good fit, schools can avoid
admitting what was really considered during the hiring process. See id.
317. See Bridgeman, supra note 10, at 263-64 (accentuating susceptibility to
categorization and stereotypes).
318. See id. at 267-68 (indicating which studies show that unconscious bias can
be eradicating from selection processes).
In light of the work in social psychology it makes sense that the selection
procedures at the player level in sports would yield better results than
those found in upper level sports jobs and other high-level jobs because
the procedures employed at the player level have more of the attribute
scholars have shown to be necessary to overcome or lessen bias.
Id. at 268. Rather, "the procedures used may even exacerbate the problem be-
cause often these jobs are hired through social networks to which few minorities
have access." Id. at 271 (explaining that in NFL Rooney Rule was able to change
this in NFL).
[Blias can be lessened when people are sufficiently motivated to do so;
when they have sufficient information; when they are in the right mood
when making a decision; when the structure of the situation is such that
the categorizing of information, which leads to bias, is either not present
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A person may be motivated to control bias either because of
one's own values or because one will be held accountable for the
decision. 319 This reduces bias because the decision-maker responds
by being more careful and deliberate, therefore relying less on ste-
reotypes and categorization and more on available information. 320
In recruiting college football coaches, it is certain that athletic di-
rectors, as decision makers, are held accountable for employment
selections and thus, are motivated to hire the best candidate.321
Consequently, something must be done to supplement the value
that athletic directors give to eradicating bias.3 22
A decision-maker can eliminate bias by removing biasing infor-
mation - race, in this instance - from one's awareness. 32 3 Moreover,
bias is reduced by resolving ambiguity, which can be accomplished
through the use of a sufficient timetable to evaluate the candidates,
a broad solicitation of information from the candidates and a more
detailed criterion by which to assess the candidates.3 24 While it is
or not salient; or when the situation lacks the ambiguity that often results
in bias.
Id. at 268.
319. See id. (citing SUSAN T. FisKE, INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE REDUCTION OF
PREJUDICE, IN REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION I 6-17 (Stuart Oskamp ed.
2000)).
320. See id. (establishing how deliberation and additional time will lead to
diversification).
321. See id. at 273 (detailing transparency and accountability in hiring
process).
322. For a further discussion of athletic directors' current values, see supra
notes 75-96 and accompanying text.
323. See Bridgeman, supra note 10, at 268-69 (citing Claudia Goldin & Cecilia
Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of 'Blind' Auditions on Female Musicians,
90 AM. ECON. REV. 715 (2000)). Major symphony orchestras were able to eliminate
unconscious bias and address the problem of underrepresentation of women by
implementing blind auditions. See id. at 272-73 (discussing results of blind audi-
tions). By switching to blind auditions, the orchestras were able to increase the
representation of women by three to five times. See id. at 273 (presenting that
before blind auditions, ten percent of new hires were women, while afterward, one
third to one half of new hires were women depending on city).
324. See id. at 269 (citing Debra E. Meyerson & Joyce K. Fletcher, A Modest
Manifesto for Shattering the Glass Ceiling, HARv. Bus. REv.,Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 133 ). In
Bridgeman's articles, she notes how Meyerson and Fletcher explain that:
[A] particular investment firm tried to hire more women by increasing
the number of interviews. When this did not work, they investigated their
entire recruiting practice .... As part of the investigation they examined
their interviewing procedures, the questions they asked during interviews,
and the places from which they recruited candidates, all in an attempt to
identify what might be preventing them from hiring women. This investi-
gation revealed that in the short thirty minutes they had been allowing
for interviews, managers often relied on their first impressions, a practice
which is "often a function of perceived similarity" and thus an easy way to
exclude out-group members .... As a result of these findings, the com-
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difficult to imagine an interview process for hiring coaches that pre-
vents an athletic director from learning the candidate's race, it
would be relatively simple for athletic directors to eliminate ambi-
guity within searches by lengthening time deadlines, soliciting more
information, and articulating criteria for evaluation. 325
Gordon discusses a method employed by the San Francisco
49ers that simultaneously lessened the effects of unconscious bias
and social networks.326  The approach, designed by Paraag
Marathe, used empirical research to compile a list of qualified can-
didates for the head coaching position.327 First, Marathe studied
performance data, such as playoff appearances, winning percent-
age, and first season record relative to their predecessor's last sea-
son record to compile a list of "elite" coaches.3 28 Second, the team
examined common characteristics of these coaches, before and af-
ter becoming head coach, and found that they worked under other
successful coaches and tended to be disciplinarians.3 29 Third, the
team searched for these qualities among assistant coaches in the
NFL; the investigation yielded twelve candidates. 330 Fourth, the
team narrowed the field to five candidates, interviewed them, and
pany lengthened their interviews to forty-five minutes and required the
managers to follow a set protocol of questions which focused the discus-
sion on what a candidate could contribute to the firm's mission. As a
result of these changes, the company obtained different, and better, in-
formation about all candidates - men and women - and begin to hire a
more diverse group.
Id. at 273-74 (analyzing two commentators' study of successful attempts at diversify-
ing workforce).
325. See id. at 273 (discussing example of investment firm's increased inter-
view time for job applicants diversifying workforce); see also Hiring Report Card,
supra note 2, at 5 (listing grading criteria and best practices). Collins also explains
that the Rooney Rule acts to slow down the hiring process and discourages pre-
selection of a candidate absent legitimate consideration of other candidates. See
Collins, supra note 2, at 905 (citing Scott Brown, Steelers' Rooney Praised for 'Rule,
KNiGHT RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEws, Feb. 3, 2007, at 1).
326. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 17 (explaining how NFL team conducted
incredibly objective search for head coaches).
327. See id. (suggesting "The MBA Way" of using different interview processes
to eliminate bias).
328. See id. (noting coaches that appeared on list included Bill Walsh, Mike
Shanahan and Bills Parcells).
329. See id. at 17-18 (discussing 49ers approach to measuring quality utilizing
qualitative factors).
330. See id. at 18 (evaluating 49ers approach to measuring quality). Marathe
apparently did not look for these qualities among college head coaches in a previ-
ous study because statistics showed they generally did not meet expectations after
being hired. See id. He also did not apply the qualities to former head coaches
because they tended to be more expensive to hire than their subsequent perform-
ance was worth. See id.
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eventually hired Mike Nolan. 33 1 By using objective criteria, the
team was able to decrease the effect of unconscious and social net-
work bias. 332 Although colleges and universities need not employ
the same system as the 49ers, removing subjectivity from hiring de-
cisions will expedite the diversification process for head coaches.3 33
B. Diversifying the Search Committee
The BCA believes that diversifying the search committee for
head coaches is critical to increasing the number of minority head
coaches. 33 4 The BCA found that for each additional minority on a
search committee, the number of minority candidates interviewed
increases by .5.335 In an article about diversifying the managerial
position in baseball, Aaron Walker suggested that teams form
player-hiring committees to address diversity-hiring issues. 3 36
Walker theorized that player committees would alleviate effects of
social networks and unconscious bias in the manager hiring pro-
cess. 3 37 Although player-hiring committees would not be practical
at the college level, universities could diversify their search commit-
tees with alumni and minority administrators. 338
331. See id. (setting forth final round of interview process). Gordon makes
sure to note that two of five final candidate were black. See id. It was only at this
final point in the interview process that the 49ers used subjective selection
processes to narrow the field of candidates. See id. The team asked 49er alums for
advice to narrow the field. See id. But at that point, all the candidates were already
qualified according to objectively measurable criteria. See id.
332. See id. at 18 (noting effectiveness of coaching search using bias-removing
network). Gordon concludes by suggesting that colleges model their searches af-
ter 49ers. See id. at 19.
333. See Bridgeman, supra 10, at 263 (offering that bias-removing interview
methods will diversify coaching positions quickly).
334. See Louis, supra note 10, at 204 (detailing BCA's findings regarding bene-
fits of diverse search committees).
335. See Hiring Report Card, supra note 2, at 9 (explaining tangible effect of
including minorities on search committees).
336. See Walker, supra note 2, at 270 (referring to diverse search committees
in baseball context). Walker outlined the plan and suggested "[t]he team would
allow two to four players to participate in the search and interview process. Id.
The players would then select who they want to be their representatives." Id.
337. See id. at 270-71 (rationalizing that although management would make
final decision, plan would help still help diversify pool).
338. See Louis, supra note 10, at 204 (illustrating resources available to schools
to diversify committees).
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C. Outside Evaluations
The BCA, through the Hiring Report Card (HRC), pressures
schools into employing best practices when hiring coaches. 339 The
HRC evaluates the hiring processes of colleges and universities and
shares the results with the public.340 The HRC grades schools on a
scale of A through F for their "inclusiveness and fairness" in hir-
ing.34 1 The report card consists of five categories: "Communica-
tion, Hiring/Search Committee, Candidates Interviewed,
Reasonable Time, and Affirmative Action." 342 The most recent
HRC graded thirty-one schools. 343
Some contend that the HRC increased interviewing opportuni-
ties for minority coaches. 344 Now, minorities comprise thirty per-
cent of the candidates interviewing for head coaching positions.345
339. See Ford, supra note 6, at 90 (discussing Hiring Report Card); Louis,
supra note 10, at 174-75 (noting BCA's release of Hiring Report Card). The BCA
also publishes a report to assess the hiring practices in Women's College Basket-
ball. See generally Black Coaches and Administrators, "SCORING THE HIRE:" A HIRING
REPORT CARD FOR NCAA DIvISION I WOMEN'S BASKETBALL HEAD COACHING POSI-
TIONS (2008) (exploring hiring decisions and practices in women's college basket-
ball). The number of women coaches has actually decreased since the passing of
Title IX and many are as concerned about the dearth of females in coaching as
they are about the underrepresentation of minorities in college football coaching.
See id. at 5.
340. See Louis, supra note 10, at 174-75 (specifying how BCA releases Annual
Report Card and effect of putting universities' hiring processes under public scru-
tiny). The Institute for Diversity and Ethics in Sports at the University of Central
Florida, directed by Dr. Richard Lapchick, also releases graded reports, but those
reports evaluate collegiate athletics and the professional leagues as opposed to in-
dividual universities. See generally Racial and Gender Report Cards 2001-2009,
TIDESPORT.ORG, http://www.tide sport.org/racialgenderreportcard.html (detailing
institutes' graded reports over number of years) [hereinafter Tidesport Report
Cards]. The most recent Racial and Gender report on collegiate athletics found
declines in the hiring of minorities and females in key positions in collegiate
sports. See Report Faults Diversity, supra note 7 (discussing decline in both racial and
gender hiring practices in key positions). Richard Lapchick said that '[t]he num-
bers reflect a need for new strategies for more opportunities for people of color
and women. This is the worst report card for college sport in many years.' Id.
341. See Ford, supra note 6, at 91 (featuring Hiring Report Card evaluation
criteria). It is the BCA's policy that to not participate is in fact to participate. See id.
at 20 (noting BCA's policy guidelines). Consequently, schools are not able to
avoid the bad publicity they get for not conforming to best practices. See id. (iden-
tifying negative effects of non-conformance). Schools that do not participate re-
ceive an "F." See id. (linking lowest grade to non-participation).
342. Hiring Report Card, supra note 2, at 20.
343. See id. (detailing recent HRC grading).
344. See Ford, supra note 6, at 91 (predicting potential positive effects of
HRC).
345. See id. (citing The Lack of Diversity in Leadership Positions in NCAA
Collegiate Sports: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Con-
sumer Protection of the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong.
(2007) (testimony of Brand), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte
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In the last HRC, however, the BCA was dubiously optimistic about
the fact that no school received an automatic F.3 46 They stated that
on the one hand, "[s] chools are respecting the process," but on the
other hand, schools continue to receive Fs.3 47 The BCA also ex-
plained that just because the numbers have not increased does not
mean that qualified coaches do not exist.3 48 Rather, if schools con-
tinue to adhere to the BCA's hiring guidelines, the representation
of minorities in head coaching positions will improve.
349
D. Gestures of Solidarity From the Student-Athlete
The BCA and Floyd Keith advocate for student-athletes to con-
sider the diversity of a school's coaching staff when deciding where
to play.350 Keith said "[w] hen student-athletes of color start making
decisions to play where it is most likely that they have a fair and
equitable opportunity to eventually coach and become an adminis-
trator, we will then, and only then, start to see a difference in the
hiring process." 35 1 When the BCA formed, it tried to market ap-
parel with the slogan "Don't Play Where You Can't Coach," but that
effort did not garner much traction. 35 2 Nonetheless, the BCA re-
mains adamant that social awareness by student-athletes will help
address the scarcity of minority coaches.3 53 Hannah Gordon agrees
_mtgs/110-ctcphrg. 022807.Brand-testimony.pdf). Consequently, one would
think that minorities would subsequently make up 30% of all hirees; but minority
coaching candidates are still being passed over for the final selection. See id. (men-
tioning common misconception concerning minority hiring practices).
346. See Hiring Report Card, supra note 2, at 28 (conveying HRC optimism
despite low grades).
347. Id. (noting mixed reception of HRC framework).
348. See id. (exploring availability of minority coaches).
349. See id. (suggesting potential for minorities in head coaching market).
350. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 15-16 (analyzing BCA's "Don't Play Where
you Can't Coach" campaign). Louis explains that the solidarity need not come
from student-athletes alone. See Louis, supra note 10, at 184-85 (describing how
parents, future students and recruits will all take notice of schools that are sued for
discrimination). He said that ordinary students can consider a school's reputation
for institutional discrimination when considering where to attend. See id. (caution-
ing that drop in students and tuition that may occur if schools are shunned follow-
ing discrimination law suit). Moreover, Louis explained that corporations can
consider what school to sponsor based on their position towards hiring minorities.
See id. at 185 (explaining how publicity of university's discriminatory practices will
make corporate sponsors "think twice" about donation and advertising).
351. Ford, supra note 6, at 111 (citing Add SeymourJr., The Diversity Lessons the
NCAA Can Learn From the NFL, DIVERSEEDUCATION.cOM, Feb. 1, 2007, http://www.
diverseeducation.com/artman/publish/article-6952.shtml)
352. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 15 (characterizing marketing effort as
missed opportunity that never caught on).
353. See Hiring Report Card, supra note 2, at 12 (indicating BCA's continued
optimism for educating student athletes about diversity issues).
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that "[if] high school recruits choose to go to schools whose staffs
reflect the diversity of their players, universities will be forced to
change." 354 The difficulty, however, lies with the pressures which
recruits face when deciding what school to attend and whether it is
realistic to expect them to risk their careers for social change. 355
E. Political Intervention
Diversity in coaching may be most easily achieved through
Congressional Intervention. 356 On February 28, 2007, the United
States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Commerce,
Trade and Consumer Protection held a hearing on the lack of di-
versity in the leadership of collegiate sports.357 The Subcommittee
and speakers discussed a number of solutions, including: providing
financial incentives to schools that hire minority coaches; eliminat-
ing the involvement of boosters in the hiring process; and imple-
menting a Rooney Rule equivalent.3 58 However, two years have
passed since the hearing and Congress has failed to pursue the is-
sue further.3 5 9
State-level politicians are also involved in the effort to diversify
college football head coaching positions. 360 Richard Codey, the
New Jersey Senate President, called upon Brand and the NCAA to
adopt an equivalent of the Rooney Rule. 36 1 Moreover, Oregon re-
354. Gordon, supra note 18, at 15.
355. See id. at 15-16 (noting attempts by UCLA athletes to raise awareness
about lack of diversity in colleges).
356. See Ford, supra note 6, at 111 ("Congressional action is necessary and
may be on horizon.").
357. See Diversity Hearing, supra note 12 (portraying hearing on lack of diver-
sity in college coaching).
358. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 156-57 (discussing hearing and solutions
discussed).
359. See id. at 157 (noting slow movement by Congress on positive ideas
voiced at hearing).
360. SeeJ. Manion, Codey Urges NCAA to End De-Facto Discrimination Against Afri-
can-American Football Coaches, POLITCrKERNJ.coM, (Dec. 26, 2008), http://www. poli-
tickernj .com/jmanion/26265/codey-urges-ncaa-end-de-facto-discrimination-
against-african-american-football-coaches (discussing N.J. Senate President and
then Acting Governor Richard J. Codey's call upon Brand to more aggressively
pursue collegiate equivalent of NFL's "Rooney Rule"); see also Mike Donovan, Ore-
gon's Proposed Rooney Rule Does Not Go Far Enough, EXAMINER.COM, Mar. 4, 2009,
http://www.examiner.com/x-2716-Oregon-College-Sports-Examiner-y2009m3d4-
Oregons-proposed-Rooney-Rule-does-not-go-far-enough (examining shortcom-
mings of representative Mitch Greenlick's minority coaching legislation).
361. See Manion, supra note 363 (highlighting Codey's call upon Myles Brand
to more aggressively pursue collegiate equivalent of NFL's "Rooney Rule"). In his
speech Codey stated:
Clearly the NCAA's effort earlier this year to encourage colleges to hire
more African American coaches was a gesture of good will that has failed
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cently adopted a law codifing the Rooney Rule. 362 The law, how-
ever, does not just apply to football, but rather requires the State's
universities to interview a minority each time it hires an athletic
director or a head coach in any sport. 363 Oregon's law applies to
the State's seven public universities until 2020. 364 Oregon's effort is
now trying to be replicated in states such as Alabama, so the statu-
tory approach can be more expansive. 365
Bridgeman posits that discrimination law needs to be adapted
to protect against unconscious bias.3 66 She, however, believes Con-
gress should make laws to create incentives for change, rather than
changing Title VII to be more responsive to individual claims.3 67
Consequently, Bridgeman proposes that the federal spending
... I think the NCAA [football] needs to renew their approach to the
situation, perhaps [by] studying how the collegiate basketball scene was
able to overcome similar obstacles over the last [twenty] years.
Id. (quoting Richard Codey). It is suggested that the success in men's college bas-
ketball can be attributed to high-ranking Division I schools hiring minorities who
succeeded at low-ranking division I schools. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 151 n.16
(discussing successful diversity hiring in men's college basketball) (citing Jeff
Zillgitt, Sampson Making Sooners a Basketball Powerhouse, USATODAY, Mar. 29, 2002,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/comment/zillgitt/2002-03-29-ziligitt.
htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2009). Nichols suggests that because "there are over 220
fewer FBS programs than Division I men's collegc basketball programs, part of the
problem could be this lack of 'lower end' programs." Nichols, supra note 6, at 151-
52. In his call to action, Senator Codey wrote a letter to the NCAA asking for "real
change." See Manion, supra note 363 (analyzing Codey's letter).
362. See Mark Hester, Kulongoski Signs Bill Requiring Interviews for Minority
Coaches, OREGONIAN, July 22, 2009, http://www.oregonlive.com/sports/index.ssf/
2009/ 07/kulongoski-signs bill-requirin.htmIl (noting that law has widespread
support among Oregon's college football coaches).
363. See Richard Lapchick, Oregon Hears the Call to Action, ESPN.coM, May 22,
2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/columns/story?columnist=lapchick-richard
&id=4199225 (describing advocacy efforts Sam Sachs and State Representative
Mitch Greenlick).
364. See Hester, supra note 366 (explaining that law's sunset clause takes effect
on January 2, 2020).
365. See id. (reporting Alabama State Representative John Rogers's intention
to introduce similar bill).
366. See Bridgeman, supra note 10, at 285 (proposing ways that legislation may
increase diversity in coaching).
367. See id. (supporting use of law "as a tool to create incentives for more
widespread change"). President LyndonJohnson used the federal spending power
to motivate hospitals to desegregate. See id. (citing LU-IN WANG, DIscIUMINATION
By DEFAULT: How RAcIsM BECOMES ROUTINE 140 (2006)). He conditioned the re-
ceipt of Medicare funds on hospitals signing guarantees that they did not 'discrimi-
nate or segregate on the basis of race, color or national origin and that the facility
was in compliance with Title VII guidelines.' Id. Ninety-two percent of hospitals
were desegregated within four months. See id. (describing effects of President
Johnson's hospital diversity plan). The use of the spending power was so effective
because the financial incentives were "forward-looking," did not involve assigning
blame, subjected all hospitals to the same pressures, and involved visible and easily
verifiable goals. See id. (examining reason for plan's success).
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power should be used to encourage employers, including colleges
and universities, to examine their hiring procedures and amend
them to provide meaningful opportunities for minorities.368
VII. CONCLUSION
The battle to diversify the head coaching positions within col-
legiate football is an important one. 3 69 But before advocates
achieve this desired diversity, they will need to successfully convince
universities that this goal is "for the good of all involved."3 70 Such
an effort may require demonstrating that the problem extends be-
yond collegiate football and sports in general, and reflects a societal
tendency to exclude minorities from high-level positions.3 71
The NCAA should consider adopting the Robinson Rule to
avoid litigation.3 72 Not only will it address the problems facing mi-
nority head coaches at the collegiate level, but it will also have a
ripple effect on diversity in the NFL by increasing the qualified can-
didates who can compete for coaching positions.3 73 If the NCAA
does not adopt the rule and the BCA assists in bringing a lawsuit
368. See id. at 286 (proposing using federal spending power and positive in-
centives to bring about change). Bridgeman also suggested that federal grants be
directed to fund research in mechanism aimed at lessening implicit bias in hiring
processes. See id. (describing alternatives to use of federal spending power).
369. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 5 (debating why people should be con-
cerned about lack of minority coaches in NCAA football). Gordon says that there
are at least three reasons why we should care about the underrepresentation of
minorities in head coaching:
First, we should care out of a general interest in fairness, equity, and the
meritocracy that sport is supposed to represent. Second, head coaches
and assistant coaches are mentors and role models in the lives of the
young men they coach. Because approximately half of those student-ath-
letes are you men of color, it is important that they have strong black and
brown male role models as well as white ones. Third, the prestige placed
on the head coach position in football makes it a signal to society about
who is valued. Sport is a microcosm of society, but is often a step ahead
because of the opportunity it affords for people of different races to inter-
act. It is a shame for sport merely to keep pace with society, reflecting
America's lower value of men of color as leaders, a signal that is sent to
athletes, aspiring coaches, and fans.
Id.
370. See Shropshire, supra note 2, at 470 (hypothesizing that showing society
that lack of minority coaches is society-wide problem may be difficult). Shropshire
notes that the Supreme Court has consistently supported the importance of diver-
sity. See id. at 470 n.84 (citing Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
371. See id. at 472 (noting that diversifying sports industry is not just about
fixing one industry).
372. See Maravent, supra note 33, at 272-73 (explaining how Rooney Rule
doubled number of African-American coaches in NFL).
373. See id. at 271-72 (accounting for Dennis Green, Tony Dungy, Marvin
Lewis and Romeo Crennel were all assistant coaches in Division I before NFL).
[Vol. 17: p. 161
66
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol17/iss1/5
"AND IT ONLY TOOK THEM 307 YEARs"
against a university, the lawsuit will be difficult to win, as is the case
for most Title VII cases.3 74 Yet, with so much resistance from the
NCAA and athletic directors towards implementing a program that
has actual potential for diversifying the head coaching ranks, Title
VII litigation may be a rapidly approaching last resort.3 75 Because
alternatives to litigation still exist, advocates should continue to
lobby for change. 376 Even though the NCAA remains stubborn to
accept change, advocates must persist in providing fresh alterna-
tives in the hope that something viable will be adopted.
3 77
Despite being constantly reminded of its inadequate response,
the NCAA does not appear to be embarrassed. It seems comforta-
ble with implementing superficial solutions to the diversity prob-
lem. Luckily, the NFL bears witness to the fact that the problem is
corrigible. Therefore, when the NCAA is ready to address the
dearth of minority coaches in college football, those minorities that
have been excluded for so long will have an opportunity to demon-
strate their capability.3 78 Football is supposed to be a meritocracy,
but until the glass ceiling for head coaches is shattered, the impor-
tance of merit will be confined to the football field.
3 79
Ron S. Hochbaum*
374. See Nichols, supra note 6, at 171 (rationalizing that there is little chance
overt racism will be involved). Nichols also discussed factors that might complicate
litigation such as multiple decision-makers involved in the hiring process, discover-
ing what criteria were considered in establishing qualifications, organizing a class,
and financial resources. See id. (isolating potential hurdles faced by college
coaches suing for racial discrimination).
375. See id. at 161-62 (discussing NCAA resistance to imposing rules on whom
universities must interview). Louis explains that a lawsuit, however, is worthwhile
because it will demonstrate to the public "that when it comes to 4th and Goal from
the 1 yard line, a school with thirty thousand students, with tens of thousands of
alumni, and millions of fans watching at home, is perfectly fine with putting its
national title hopes into the hands of a Black athlete on the field. However, when
it comes to calling that play from the sidelines, it appears the consensus is that that
job is reserved for White head coaches." Louis, supra note 10, at 184.
376. See Maravent and Tario, supra note 33, at 48 (describing difficulties in
pursuing diversity matters through litigation).
377. For a further discussion of ways to diversify NCAA head football coaches,
see supra notes 307-70.
378. See Hiring Report Card, supra note 2, at 37 (commenting that solutions
are present if NCAA wants to change).
379. See Walker, supra note 2, at 250 (arguing that race is still factor in sports).
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